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ARTICLES
AUER DEFERENCE: DOUBLING DOWN ON
DELEGATION’S DEFECTS
Ronald A. Cass*
Together with the better-known Chevron deference rule, the doctrine
articulated in Auer v. Robbins two decades ago—which makes reasonable
administrative constructions of ambiguous administrative rules binding on
courts in most circumstances—has become a focal point for concerns about
the expanding administrative state. Auer deference, even more than Chevron
deference, enlarges administrative authority in ways that are at odds with
basic constitutional structures and due process requirements. Objections to
Auer have provided cogent reasons for why courts should not grant
deference to administrative interpretations merely because an agency’s rule
is unclear. The most commonly voiced objections, however, do not explain
why Congress should be disabled in all instances from granting
administrators discretionary authority over rule interpretation—even in
settings that do not raise serious risks of partiality or unfair surprise in
administrative construction.
Examining the relationship between statutorily directed deference and
constitutional-structural principles clarifies the essential underlying
objection to Auer and the limits of that objection. When Congress by law
confers discretionary authority that does not exceed its constitutional power
to delegate functions to an administrator, courts should respect that
assignment of authority, unless it violates other specific constitutional
commands. Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with
the Constitution, extending deference—especially expanding deference as
Auer does in successive determinations—exacerbates delegations’
difficulties.
* Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Law; Chairman and Resident Scholar, Center
for the Rule of Law; President, Cass & Associates, PC; Senior Fellow, Center for the Study
of the Administrative State; Senior Fellow, International Centre for Economic Research.
Among those whose comments and conversations were helpful to work on this Article and its
central ideas are Justice Samuel Alito, Aditya Bamzai, Jack Beermann, Christopher DeMuth,
Douglas Ginsburg, Boyden Gray, Kristin Hickman, Gary Lawson, Richard Pierce, A.
Raymond Randolph, Glen Robinson, Justice Clarence Thomas, Christopher Walker, and
especially Justice Antonin Scalia, who discussed, debated, and reflected on much of what is
important to this Article through innumerable conversations. Any errors that remain are mine
alone.
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A reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine would solve the major Auer
problem directly, and elimination of Auer-like deference would clearly be
preferable to retaining the doctrine in its current form. Short of that,
demanding that the statutory basis for deference is clearly articulated would
provide a modest first step in cabining problems associated with
constitutionally questionable delegations of lawmaking authority. Those
who embrace the rule of law, whether advocates or opponents of the modern
administrative state, should support that step.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins1
announced that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is
“controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”2
The internal quotation marks traced the Auer doctrine back through an earlier
citation to the Court’s 1945 opinion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,3
a relatively obscure decision on a challenge to a detail in the administration
of wartime price controls.4 Auer seemed, at the time, a matter-of-fact
application of law in a setting that evinced little reason for debate. It was a
short, straightforward opinion for a unanimous Court, authored by one of the
Court’s most universally recognized experts on administrative law: Justice
Antonin Scalia.
In the following two decades, however, the consensus behind Auer
unraveled. Justice Scalia himself became one of the doctrine’s most ardent
critics, declaring publicly that there was “no good reason” for deference to
an agency interpretation of its own rules.5 He commented privately and
publicly that the opinion did not grapple with the weakness of the doctrine it
extracted from Seminole Rock because no one on the Court at the time
thought the doctrine debatable (a problem he attributed more generally to

1. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
2. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
3. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
4. See generally id.
5. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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unanimous decisions).6 Since that admission, several other justices have also
openly questioned the doctrine, and the Court limited its application in at
least one respect.7
The academic community has also generated a growing body of criticism
and skepticism about the doctrine. Specifically, critics comment on its
evolution from a modest rule for review of price-controls administration, to
a general rule of deference to interpretations of agency regulations.8 Most
trenchantly, contemporaneous with Auer’s expansion of Seminole Rock,
Professor (now Dean) John Manning articulated a cogent assault on
conflating Chevron deference—deference at least nominally based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.9—with deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own rules.10 Professor Manning explained that the settings in which Chevron
and Auer apply have very different implications for separation of powers and
due process concerns about deference.11 Additionally, he explained that
Auer deference undermines a key due process concept—separating law
creation and application.12
The challenges to Auer deference may not undo the doctrine in the near
term. Despite the criticisms, some justices may prefer to maintain avenues
for deference to agency decisions, even while retrenching from the stronger
forms of deference represented by Chevron and Auer as once conceived by
Justice Scalia.13
6. See, e.g., Decker, 568 U.S. at 616–21 (“Our cases have not put forward a persuasive
justification for Auer deference. The first case to apply it, Seminole Rock, offered no
justification whatever . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker,
568 U.S. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
567 U.S. 142, 155–59 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive
Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 924–27 (2017); Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present, and
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form, and Function in Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 644 (2014); Sanne H. Knudsen &
Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47, 68–
99 (2015); Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 953–55 (2017)
[hereinafter Nielson, Beyond]; see also Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron
Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–10 (2018); Aaron
Nielson, Reflections on Seminole Rock: The Past, Present, and Future of Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 12. 2016), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/reflections-on-seminole-rock-the-past-present-and-future-of-deference-to-agencyregulatory-interpretations/ [https://perma.cc/Z8Z4-QLEJ].
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. See generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
11. See id. at 638–54. Because Auer had yet to be decided when Professor Manning wrote
his article, he referred to Seminole Rock deference, not Auer deference. Text references to
Auer deference in describing his work are for consistency with the rest of this Article.
12. See id.; see also id. at 669–74.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001). Justice Scalia’s
view of Chevron deference, as well as of Auer deference, changed over time as he recognized
that his defense of it as deference to reasonable agency determinations within the scope of
law-bound agency discretion (as interpreted by courts) did not represent the dominant,
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Nonetheless, the doctrine should be rejected. The argument made by
Professor Manning highlights one legal-structural problem with Auer.14
Professor Manning’s work, along with other scholarship and commentary
from Supreme Court justices, also points to potential strategic concerns with
Auer—ways in which administrators might consciously expand their own
authority through less clear rules expecting that they will receive deference
to their subsequent interpretations.15 Reflections on Auer’s impact also point
to considerations, such as the absence of “fair warning,”16 that intersect with
both due process and strategic-action critiques.17
The best reason for abandoning the doctrine, however, is not either of the
principal arguments already suggested by scholars and justices disaffected
with Auer. Instead, deference to agency interpretations of agency rules
should be seen as problematic in settings where the agency’s authority itself
is problematic for reasons directly related to questions about how that
authority fits specific statutory instructions and, more generally, the
underlying constitutional structure. The set of considerations associated with
concerns over the sort of authority delegated to administrators holds the key
to understanding Auer’s difficulty. Finding grounds to believe that
administrators actually enjoy statutory discretion to both adopt rules and
interpret them is the starting point. More often, the problem lies in the nature
of the statutory delegation. Simply put, in settings that do not involve
questionable delegations of authority, deference is defensible (even when not
preferable)—but where agency authority exceeds or at least strains
constitutional-structural limits, deference has particularly pernicious effects.
At times, agency authority is clearly within the bounds of executive power,
and the rules being interpreted and applied make the sorts of technical or
managerial judgments that appropriately are left to administrators.18 In those
consistent approach taken by the courts. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Administrative Law in
Nino’s Wake: The Scalia Effect on Method and Doctrine, 32 J.L. & POL. 277, 287–90 (2017).
14. See Manning, supra note 10, at 631–54 (discussing the legal-structural problem that
was established in Seminole Rock “[b]y permitting agencies both to write regulations and to
construe them authoritatively”); see also Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50,
68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation
of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”).
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11–12 (1996); Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8 at 953–
57; see also Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]or an agency to issue vague
regulations . . . maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law
through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”).
16. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012).
17. See, e.g., id. at 155–57; Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring); Anthony,
supra note 15, at 11–12; Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48, 655–57; Nielson, Beyond, supra
note 8, at 954; Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1485–86 (2011).
18. In fact, that has been a principal argument in favor of deference to agency
determinations cast as interpretations of law, but probably better characterized as decisions on
matters for which the law prescribes administrative discretion. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson
Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991). See generally,
e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
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settings, deference to the agency’s interpretation of its own rule may well
make sense. The agency, after all, possesses expertise on such matters and
presumably will better understand and articulate the meaning of a rule that
may be less clear to judges. This vision of deference conforms to the
understanding supporting Seminole Rock.19
Other times, agency authority is difficult to square with a robust vision of
constitutionally separated powers, where Congress must, through
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking processes, make the judgments on
critical issues.20 In those settings, administrative decision-making, unless
carefully cabined, at best stretches, and more likely breaks, the separation of
powers embedded in the Constitution.21 Where that is the case, allowing
administrators not only to write the rules, but also to receive deference when
interpreting them, significantly expands a questionable power. Interpretive
deference inevitably accords scope for administrators to reinterpret and
revise the rules.22 Arguments for expertise, efficiency, or predictability must
be viewed differently—and a great deal more skeptically—in such settings.
Auer serves, in this context, to magnify problems created by a nonworking
nondelegation doctrine. Reinvigorating that doctrine would be beneficial,
but replacing Auer with a more thoughtful approach to deference is an
essential first step.

549 (1985); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 391 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–63.
20. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 141–61 (2016); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–53 (2002). See generally, e.g.,
Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463 (2015); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Substance];
David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional
Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1987) [hereinafter Schoenbrod,
Separation of Powers].
21. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93
VA. L. REV. 1035, 1042–43 (2007) [hereinafter Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot]; Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1311–12 (2003); Cass, supra note 20, at 177; Lawson,
supra note 20, at 343–53; Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 20, at 378–79.
22. Post-Auer decisions have somewhat reduced the scope for such revisionist authority.
See generally Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). Scholarly
commentary has suggested other amendments to Auer that could further limit that authority.
See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 677–93; Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8, at 989–1001;
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1466–1503; Walker, supra note 8, at 107–10; Derek
A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1746–48 (2014). As discussed infra, however, deference to agency
rule interpretation predicated on Auer necessarily accords a degree of additional authority at
odds with the sort of concerns articulated by those qualifications of the Auer doctrine.
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I. BASICS OF DEFERENCE: APA TO CHEVRON
Understanding the need to replace Auer with a more thoughtful approach
to deference begins with understanding the place of discretion and its
corollary, deference, in our basic statutory framework for administrative
process and review of administrative actions—the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)—and the concepts of governance it incorporates. That
framework, along with the Supreme Court’s attempt in Chevron to articulate
better when deference is appropriate, is the focus of this Part.
A. Law Interpretation and Policy Discretion
The APA, which both codified and organized prior precedents on judicial
review, states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”23 The Act goes
on to specify that the court will “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”24
These provisions plainly make judges the decision makers on questions of
law—all questions of law—that are properly brought before them for review.
That much should be common ground to any discussion of judicial review of
administrative actions.25 For interpretations of law, there is no mention of
judicial deference to administrators or anyone else in the APA’s direction,
either on the meaning of statutory provisions or on the “meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action,”26 a phrase that unequivocally
includes agency rules.27 However, the APA also makes two other matters
clear that provide grist for a host of arguments about what constitutes a
question of law and about what questions are properly before courts for
review.
First, while courts determine the meaning of statutes and give instruction
to the agencies on the law’s boundaries around the agencies’ authorized
sphere of action, the APA contemplates that there are matters on which the
law grants administrators discretion.28 Exercises of discretion are generally
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
24. Id. § 706(2)(A).
25. See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 8, at 989–90; Clark Byse, Judicial Review of
Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 255, 262–63, 266–67 (1988); Ronald A. Cass, Is Chevron’s Game Worth the Candle?
Burning Interpretation at Both Ends, in LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF
THE STATE 57, 57–58 (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016); Cynthia Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
472–73 (1989); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 187–90 (1992); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512–14.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
27. Id. § 551(13) (“‘[A]gency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency
rule . . . .”).
28. Id. §§ 701(a)(2), 706(2); see also The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory
Questions in Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
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reviewable, but only for certain defects of reasoning or process, rather than
for simple mistakes in judgment. The basic rule of deference to
administrative judgments on matters of discretion is encapsulated in the
provision for reviewing courts to set aside agency decisions that are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”29
Second, the scope of the courts’ authority to review—and, thus,
necessarily, to make decisions on the meaning of legal instructions and the
consistency of agency actions with them—is also limited by the law’s
commitment of discretion to an agency. The introductory language to the
APA’s chapter on judicial review states that “[t]his chapter applies . . . except
to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law.”30 Statutory preclusion of judicial
review necessarily excepts from review all matters of administrative
Commitment of a matter to agency discretion gives
discretion.31
administrators a zone of unreviewable discretion for a subset of
determinations otherwise subject to judicial scrutiny under the APA.32
B. Discretion: Reviewable and Not
Understanding just where the line is between what courts can review and
what falls within administrators’ unreviewable discretion—and how to think
about those issues—is important and has a fairly clear logic within the text
of the law. The understanding starts with the way the APA’s two references
to review of agency discretionary decision-making fit together.
1. Ordinary Discretion
The instructions in APA section 701 on the applicability of the provisions
on judicial review and section 706 on the specific standards to be employed
in judicial review describe two sides of the same coin with respect to agency
discretion and judicial authority.33 When matters are properly before them,
courts pronounce the meaning of law but do not intrude on matters of
implementation given to agency discretion. That is the reason that section
701 makes the review chapter applicable “except to the extent that . . . agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law.”34 The emphasized wording
is plainly different from a statement that review is unavailable whenever
Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 47–50,
52–55 (2016) (statement of George Shepherd, Professor, Emory University School of Law);
Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1488–89
(1982).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
30. Id. § 701(a).
31. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469, 495–502 (1986).
32. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–601 (1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
33. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 706(2).
34. Id. § 701(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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agency action is committed to agency discretion; the law does not employ
that wording or other, similar language indicating that any degree of
discretion, large or small, ousts courts of review authority.
The sense of the APA’s phrasing is that whatever discretion the law gives
to the agency lies outside the purview of judicial second-guessing, but most
discretionary authority coexists with review of some dimension. So, for
example, the Federal Communications Act’s assignment of broad authority
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to allocate the radio
spectrum to different broadcasting outlets and to select licensees to operate
them,35 obviously is not unlimited. It would not encompass preferences for
commissioners’ relatives or failure to accord statutorily prescribed hearing
rights to applicants.36 This was accepted law before the APA and comports
with section 706’s directive for courts to set aside actions that constitute an
abuse of discretion—agency discretion generally permits action up to (but
only up to) the limits set by governing legal instructions and in many settings
also by notions of reasonableness and procedural regularity.
2. Discretion Beyond Review
At times, however, the level of decision-making discretion given to
agencies does not allow for any meaningful judicial review. Imagine, for
example, that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is given
clear discretion by law to decide which agents to send on particular
assignments. Permitting judicial review of the director’s decisions would
inevitably undermine his authority as director and potentially compromise
CIA operations. Claims that he routinely gave the worst, most dangerous
assignments to evangelical Christians—or Jews or Muslims or Asian
Americans—could not be brought into court without compromising control
over agency functioning, which is exactly the opposite of what the
commitment of discretion to the director was designed to accomplish. As
bad as those sorts of discrimination are, the choice the law makes is to live
with the risk of that occurring (or to address it through avenues other than the
courts) rather than chance undermining the CIA’s core functions.
The example above is analogous to allowing players to challenge a football
coach’s decisions on who should be the primary receiver on a passing play
or who should be a starting player in a given game. While a coach can make
mistakes and even give sway to indefensible prejudices, providing avenues
for challenging such decisions inevitably undermines the coach’s authority.
That is not to say there is no recourse for bad decisions by the coach. A
pattern of bad decisions (or even an especially significant single bad
decision) based on personal, religious, racial, or other biases rather than
reasoned judgment on players’ merits would harm team performance and, of
course, could provide ground for the team’s management to replace the
35. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940).
36. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
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coach. In fact, management could replace the coach simply because it deems
the coach’s decisions inappropriate or based on biases that management does
not endorse or accept. But reviewing each decision to assess its basis is
incompatible with vesting authority in the coach.
Similarly, bad management by the CIA director would provide reason for
the president to replace the director. But the notion of judicial review
coexisting with discretion in the director’s decisions on how to deploy his
personnel—just like review of coaching decisions on use of players—is
unreasonable. That is why APA section 701 supposes that there are some
decisions for which the extent of discretion given by law effectively prevents
review.37
The Supreme Court’s decision in Webster v. Doe,38 in a factual setting
close to the CIA hypothetical above, takes up the scope of section 701’s
exception for decisions committed to agency discretion by law.39 Section
102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 states that “the Director of
Central Intelligence may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the
employment of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
whenever the Director deems the termination of employment of such officer
or employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”40
A “covert electronics technician”41 employed by the CIA was terminated on
the ground that his “homosexuality posed a threat to security.”42 The nature
of the threat was not disclosed to the employee or during subsequent
litigation, which asserted, among other things, violations of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.43
The majority declared that the statute’s language “fairly exudes deference
to the Director, and appears . . . to foreclose the application of any
meaningful judicial standard of review.”44 It added, “[t]he language of
§ 102(c) thus strongly suggests that its implementation was ‘committed to
agency discretion by law’”45 and also observed that “assessment [of whether
a termination protects the interests of the United States] is the Director’s
alone.”46 The majority repeated that “the section does commit employment
termination decisions to the Director’s discretion, and precludes challenges
to these decisions based upon the statutory language of § 102(c).”47 Yet, the
majority also decided that the law permits “consideration of colorable
constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to

37. See, e.g., Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of “Committed
to Agency Discretion,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368 (1968).
38. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
39. See generally id.
40. 50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) (2012).
41. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 594.
42. Id. at 595.
43. Id. at 596.
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 603.
47. Id.
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[§ 102(c)]”48 because those claims are not to be presumed barred without a
“heightened showing”49 of legislative intent to do that.50
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Scalia agreed that the
termination decision is committed to the director’s discretion, and his alone,
but dissented from the conclusion that it could still be subject to review for
possible constitutional defect.51 Justice O’Connor observed that the
protection of national security lies at the core of executive responsibility and
the commitment of discretion to the executive branch in such matters is
consistent with constitutional design and historical practice.52
Even more than Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia framed the matter in
terms of the division between discretion that is made unreviewable by APA
section 701(a)(2) and other discretion (what might be termed “ordinary”
discretion).53 He explained that section 701(a)(2) covers “discretion . . . ‘of
the sort that is traditionally unreviewable’” and “operates to keep certain
categories of agency action out of the courts; but when agency action is
appropriately in the courts, abuse of discretion is of course grounds for
reversal.”54 In addition to the sort of security-related judgments presented in
the legislation at issue in Webster v. Doe, the category of unreviewable
discretion encompasses judgments assigned to prosecutorial discretion.
These include prosecution-like regulatory enforcement, such as the
discretion recognized in Heckler v. Chaney,55 which rejected as
unreviewable a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
failure to bring enforcement actions against allegedly unauthorized uses of
FDA-approved drugs.56
Scalia’s Webster v. Doe dissent explained that the difference between the
phrasing of the first provision of APA section 701(a) (“statutes preclude
judicial review”) and the second provision (“committed to agency discretion
by law”) reflects the broader set of legal rules that insulate certain decisions
from review in the latter setting.57 In essence, his argument is that the
structure of government and of historically accepted roles for executive and
other officials place certain decisions squarely in executive hands and, hence,
without clear statutory instruction to the contrary, off-limits to courts.58

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 603–04.
51. Id. at 605–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 606–10
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 605–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 606–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 610.
55. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
56. Id. at 837–38; see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 608–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. at 608–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See id.
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C. Chevron: Discretion’s Sounds of Silence
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron has spawned a
voluminous literature,59 the decision as conceived and understood at the time
was entirely in line with the approaches embraced in the APA.60 Further,
even though Chevron predates those approaches, it was also consistent with
the approaches taken in Chaney and in the O’Connor and Scalia dissents in
Webster v. Doe. Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) implementation of section 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.61 That provision required states that failed to meet
national air quality standards (“nonattainment” states) to set up permit
programs to regulate emissions from “new or modified major stationary
sources” of pollution.62 The EPA adopted a rule that permitted states to treat
“pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though
they were encased within a single ‘bubble.’”63 For example, it would allow
states to implement section 172(b)(6)’s mandate by treating all smokestacks
on a single factory property as one “stationary source” for purposes of
regulation.64
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the EPA’s
rule as contrary to the meaning of the law’s requirement to regulate emissions
from “stationary sources” and asserted that each individual smokestack had
to be regulated independently.65 The Supreme Court, reversing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, upheld the EPA rule as a reasonable
policy judgment on a matter within its authority under a complex statutory
scheme that did not explicitly define the meaning of “stationary source.”66
The Court emphasized that the dispute over the “bubble concept” was in
reality a debate over policy, concluding:
The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties’ briefs
create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum
a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency and in the

59. In fact, Chevron is the most cited and most discussed decision in administrative law.
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (2010); Gary
Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013); Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens
and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2012); Peter L. Strauss,
“Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 n.1 (2012).
60. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 398–402 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
Chevron actually was not decided under the APA, but instead under a provision of the Clean
Air Act that repeated—almost verbatim—the relevant scope-of-review language from APA
section 706.
61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 846–47.
65. Id. at 859–60.
66. Id. at 859–66.
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32 jurisdictions opting for the “bubble concept,” but one which was never
waged in the Congress.67

The Court went on, “[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the
public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches.’”68
Before upholding the EPA’s “bubble concept” as a proper exercise of
policymaking authority, however, the Court had to establish that the EPA
possessed the discretion to make that policy choice.69 Although some
provisions in the Clean Air Act speak expressly to the agency’s discretionary
authority,70 the language respecting permit programs in “nonattainment”
states did not. Recognizing that, the Court made plain in Chevron what it
had decided in other cases: that statutory silence or ambiguity could indicate
a commitment of authority to an agency charged with implementing the
statutory scheme.71 Chevron’s famous two-step test—asking, first, if the law
spoke to the precise question at issue (decided by the courts using “traditional
tools of statutory construction”)72 and, second, if not, whether the agency
decision fits within a reasonable construction of the law73—simply
recapitulates the understanding encapsulated in the APA, that the courts
construe the law, decide how far the law grants discretion to agency
policymaking, and check reviewable exercises of discretion by agencies only
for reasonableness.74
The basic message of Chevron, thus, was neither novel nor in tension with
prior law.75 It merely held that when the law gives discretion to an executive
67. Id. at 864.
68. Id. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
69. Id. at 843–45.
70. For discussion of one example, see generally Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA:
The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 75 (2007).
71. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862, 865.
72. Id. at 843 n.9.
73. Id. at 842–44.
74. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Scalia, supra note 25, at 516. There are many
reasoned arguments against Chevron deference. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 25, at 260–61. See
generally, e.g., Beermann, supra note 59; Cass, supra note 25; John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–211 (1998);
Farina, supra note 25; Herz, supra note 25. These arguments are almost invariably predicated
on applications of Chevron that are in tension with its emphasis on courts as ultimate decision
makers on statutes’ meaning or on the infelicitous phrasing in parts of the Chevron opinion
that permitted such applications. See generally Cass, supra note 25 (discussing misconceived
applications of Chevron).
75. See, e.g., id. at 57–58; Lawson & Kam, supra note 59, at 33; Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001); Merrill, supra
note 60, at 400; Strauss, supra note 59, at 1161–63. Some arguments promote the idea that
Chevron can be seen as taking a positive step by clarifying the understanding that laws can
commit discretion to agencies by implication and, yet, appropriately circumscribing
deference. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1257–58 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 301, 310–12 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986).
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official, judges should give deference to the official’s exercise of that
discretion up to its legal limits.76 As the Court put the point later:
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.77

The sense of this position should be evident if one looks, for example, at
the Communications Act of 1934’s directive to the FCC to allocate radio
licenses as “the public convenience, interest, or necessity” requires.78 The
law does not use the words “in its discretion” nor did it need to—the grant of
discretion was clear from the structure of the law (assigning the FCC wideranging authority over spectrum allocation and licensing) and the broad
language of the statutory directive.79 As already noted, that implicit grant of
discretion was not unlimited, and Chevron, consistent with decisions
stretching back before the APA,80 would recognize both the statutory terms’
implicit grant of discretion and the law’s implicit limitations on the agency’s
discretion.81
II. AGENCY RULE INTERPRETATION: AUER’S WRONG TURN
Understood as a commonsense canon of statutory construction, Chevron—
in keeping with the APA’s approach to deference and the Supreme Court’s
elucidation of that approach in cases like Chaney and, more clearly, Justice
Scalia’s Webster v. Doe dissent—reflects an appreciation that the root
concepts underlying reviewability and review standards are separation-ofpowers considerations.82 While courts interpret the laws as needed to resolve
disputes properly before them, they respect the power over implementation
of the laws assigned to agencies by Congress. Deference follows
delegation.83
76. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 57–58; Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?
Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1294, 1314 (2015); Scalia, supra note 25, at 516.
77. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996).
78. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).
79. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214–17, 224 (1943); FCC
v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); Cass, supra note 25, at 58.
80. See generally, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1943); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933).
81. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Lawson & Kam, supra note 59, at 33; Merrill,
supra note 60, at 400.
82. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 57; Cass, supra note 76, at 1302–03; Scalia, supra
note 25, at 515; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–120 (2008) (explaining seven levels of deference, keyed
primarily to statutory and constitutional delegations of authority).
83. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 25, at 58; Cass, supra note 76, at 1314–15; Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
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The Court’s decision in Auer, however, is a striking departure from that
understanding. It is especially striking given that the decision’s author,
Justice Scalia, was one of the Court’s strongest and clearest exponents of
bedrock separation-of-powers concepts.84 Further, the case Auer purports to
follow, Seminole Rock, can be squared with those concepts in ways Auer
cannot. Even the case through which Auer traces its Seminole Rock quote,
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,85 provides little help. In the
end, Auer is best seen as announcing a rule that is poorly explained and is an
unnecessary departure from prior law.
A. Right Start, Wrong Turn: Switching Auer
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously opined (in a case he thought
was not so hard) that “hard cases make bad law.”86 In administrative law,
however, easy cases repeatedly have been vehicles for announcements of bad
law.87 The Auer decision and the cases it leaned on for support are examples.
1. Simply Chevron
The plaintiffs in Auer, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant, sued for
overtime pay allegedly due under terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).88 The Act’s overtime pay provisions exempt employees who hold
“executive, administrative, or professional” positions,89 and the Secretary of
Labor had issued regulations specifying that this exemption applied to
employees who, among other things, were paid a certain amount on a “salary
basis.”90 The regulations also explained that payment on a “salary basis”
required set compensation that was not subject to reduction (within a certain
time period) “because of variations in the quality or quantity of work
performed.”91
The primary arguments in Auer concerned whether the plaintiffs fit the
definition of “executive, administrative, or professional” employees and
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2002); Manning, supra
note 10, at 623; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 25–27 (1983); Robert Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 106–07 (1944), cited in Monaghan, supra, at
27.
84. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417–22 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cass,
supra note 13, at 279–88.
85. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
86. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
a broad explanation of the uneasy fit between facts and principles, see generally Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
87. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (misapplying the “major
questions” canon of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)); Ass’n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–56 (1970) (misreading APA
section 702 to create a new “zone of interests” test for standing to sue).
88. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 455 (1997).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 454.
90. Auer, 519 U.S at 455.
91. Id.
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whether they were subject to reductions in pay because they could suffer pay
deductions under disciplinary rules dealing with various regulatory
infractions.92 Plaintiffs also argued that the Secretary’s rules should not
apply—at least not in the same way—to public sector employees, by
specifically asserting that the “no disciplinary deductions” aspect of the
salary-basis rule cannot reasonably apply in the public sector.93
At the outset, the Court recounted that “[t]he FLSA grants the Secretary
broad authority to ‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ the scope of the exemption for
executive, administrative, and professional employees.”94 It then observed
that the FLSA does not provide specific direction on the question presented
and that it was reasonable for the Secretary to have concluded that the same
rule can apply to public sector employees as to private sector employees.95
So far, the Auer Court was engaged in straightforward application of the
Chevron test in a context in which the law was consistent with the grant of
significant policy-implementation authority to the Secretary of Labor.
Despite language sounding as if the question were one of statutory
interpretation, the Court effectively recognized only the administrative
discretion to give effect to the general legal directive embodied in the FLSA.
2. Reasonable Construction, Unreasoned Deference
The next segment of the Court’s decision, however, in which it turned to
application of the Secretary’s salary-basis regulation to the St. Louis police
officers, took a decidedly wrong turn. The question was whether being
“subject to” salary reductions for discipline required regular imposition of
such deductions on similar employees or only the possibility of their
imposition under the employees’ terms of employment.96 That question had
divided the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court had asked the Secretary
of Labor (who was not a party to the litigation between the police officers
and the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners) to submit an amicus brief
explaining his view.97 The Secretary’s brief stated that the regulation applied
only when disciplinary deductions from employees’ salaries were
“significantly likely” to be imposed on the employees at issue, and the Court
found that reading consistent with dictionary meanings of “subject to” as well
as the logic of the regulation.98
The problem with Auer was not its acceptance of the Secretary’s reading
as a proper interpretation of the regulation; on its face, it is a reasonable—
probably the most reasonable—reading of the rule. The Court erred,
however, in framing acceptance of that reading as a matter of deference. In
the Court’s words: “Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 456 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1)).
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 461–62.
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Secretary’s own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our
jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”’ That deferential standard is easily met here.”99 Having
explained clearly just two years earlier that Chevron deference follows from
legal delegation of discretion—and only so far as that discretion reaches100—
and then having applied that understanding in the first part of its opinion in
Auer, one might have thought that the Court would have asked whether the
FLSA granted discretion to the Secretary that extended far enough to cover
his interpretation of this regulation.
In other words, the justices could have asked directly what the parameters
of the Secretary’s discretion were beyond those necessary to apply Chevron:
what discretion did the law give the Secretary not only to adopt rules
implementing the statute and to revise rules if he thought a different
regulation better advanced relevant policy goals,101 but also to interpret
regulations already adopted? The Court’s opinion instead treats the matter
as if it is disposed of by the regime of deference to agency rule interpretation
set out in two prior cases, and it articulates a broader deference principle than
applies under Chevron—and much broader than the terms of the APA.
B. Unforced Errors: Seminole Rock and Robertson102
Before examining the problem with this approach, it is worth looking at
the two cases cited by the Auer Court, Seminole Rock and Robertson. As
explained below, while those cases did lay out the test repeated in Auer, they
did not implement it or provide a reasonable basis for it.103
1. Seminole Rock’s Pricing Problem
Seminole Rock concerned the interpretation of a regulation adopted by the
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) under the Price
Control Act of 1942.104 In keeping with the Act, the Administrator adopted
a general price control regulation as well as regulations for specific products
and industries. The specific regulation challenged in Seminole Rock was
Maximum Price Regulation No. 188.105 The regulation mandated a price
“freeze” on building products and pegged maximum prices to those charged
99. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
100. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995).
101. Respecting revision of rules as part of the Chevron framework, see, for example, Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (explaining
that the FCC’s choice among policies is discretionary and survives judicial affirmance of a
different discretionary—not legally mandated—choice).
102. This section draws on Brief of Professors—Dean Ronald A. Cass et al.—as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct.
1239 (2017) (No. 16-273) [hereinafter Professors’ Brief].
103. See infra Parts II.B.1–4.
104. The basic framework for the Act is set out in Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413–16. See
also Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–59; Helen B. Norem, The “Official
Interpretation” of Administrative Regulations, 32 IOWA L. REV. 697, 701–10 (1947).
105. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 411; 7 Fed. Reg. 5872, 7967, 8943 (July 30, 1942).
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by the seller in March 1942.106 The regulation also gave three alternative
methods for calculating prices charged in that month and set the order in
which those methods should be utilized (starting with a preferred
methodology with the other methods only used, in the order listed, if facts
necessary for the preferred, higher-listed approach or approaches were not
present).107
The OPA determined that a contract entered into by Seminole Rock for a
sale of crushed stone to a government contractor violated Regulation No. 188
and sought enforcement of the regulation in district court.108 The specific
question posed by the sale was whether the correct maximum price under the
regulation was fixed by a prior contract entered into in October 1941 or by
one entered into in January 1942.109 The actual delivery dates for such
contracts vary depending on the buyer’s need for the stone (used primarily
for making concrete), and Seminole Rock made a delivery under the earlier
contract in March 1942 while its delivery under the later contract was delayed
until August.110 OPA read its regulation as fixing the correct price as that set
in the October 1941 contract in light of its actual delivery date.111 Seminole
Rock argued that the regulation’s first-listed methodology required both a
charge and delivery during March 1942 (not a much earlier contract and later
delivery); without that, OPA should have used the second-listed
methodology under which the price that should control was the (far-higher)
price set in the January 1942 contract.112 Both the district court and court of
appeals agreed with Seminole Rock.113
2. Reading Regulations—Construction’s Traditional Tools
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts. In explaining the
basis for its different conclusion, the Court repeatedly emphasized its own
reading of the regulation at issue. It stated, for example, “[a]s we read the
regulation . . . rule (i) clearly applies to the facts of this case,”114 and “[o]ur
reading of the language of . . . Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 and the
consistent administrative interpretation of the phrase ‘highest price charged
during March, 1942’ . . . compel the conclusion” respecting the meaning of
the rule.115 Professor Aditya Bamzai reports that the original draft of the
opinion declared that the Court’s reading was “compelled” by the “plain

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413.
See id. at 414–15.
See id. at 412–13.
See id.
See id. at 412.
See id. at 415.
See id.
See id. at 412–13.
See id. at 415 (emphasis added).
Id. at 418 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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words” of the regulation, an even more clearly nondeferential statement than
appeared in the Court’s published opinion.116
If any reasonable administrative construction sufficed, as the opinion
asserts in passing (in the quotation that became the Auer test), the Court
would not have needed to emphasize that construction’s accord with the
Court’s own interpretation of the rule—much less present its interpretation
before any discussion of reasons to credit the agency’s reading. In a very
short opinion that is noted for its articulation of a principle of judicial
deference, the number of statements indicating that the Court is construing
the regulation directly, not deferentially, is striking.117 To be sure, the Court
did specifically note the fact that its reading of the regulation was the same
as the agency’s reading and that the agency had construed the regulation
consistently in this manner.118 But these observations seem less prerequisites
to the Court’s decision than window dressing to its independent reading of
the rule.119
Basing the decision on its own reading of the regulation, just as it would a
decision on the meaning of a law, also fit the arguments made by the agency.
Professor Bamzai recounts that the brief filed for OPA by Henry Hart
(working at OPA on leave from his teaching post) urged that the Court should
construe the rule like it would a statute and should look to the intention of
the rule’s author—in this case, the agency.120 Hart argued that this was also
a reason for deference, as the Administrator of OPA would have special
insight on the intent of the rule.121
More tellingly, Hart’s special plea was that the construction of the rule
urged by the agency fit with extrinsic evidence that this was the correct
interpretation, and he noted that this construction was not advanced for the
first time in litigation but instead had been followed by the agency
consistently since the regulation’s adoption.122 That provided evidence of
the agency’s understanding of the rule and at least inferential evidence of
what those subject to the rule would have understood it to mean (assuming
that they had access to the agency’s interpretation).
3. Deference Defended: Seminole Rock’s Special Case
On this last point, Seminole Rock presents the most compelling factual
basis for deference: as the Court’s decision relates, OPA had not only
adopted its reading of the rule contemporaneously with the rule’s
116. See Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole
Rock Opinion, NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 12, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
henry-harts-brief-frank-murphys-draft-and-the-seminole-rock-opinion-by-aditya-bamzai/
[https://perma.cc/CLR4-DTWQ].
117. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639; Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 60;
Manning, supra note 10, at 619; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1454.
118. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 418.
119. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639.
120. See Bamzai, supra note 116.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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promulgation, it had announced and publicly disseminated its interpretation
at the same time and in the same place as its public notifications about the
underlying rule.123 This is the functional equivalent of having made the
agency interpretation part of the rule itself. Viewed in this way, reliance on
the agency’s interpretation simply gives effect to the rule as adopted. At that
point, any question of agency authority collapses into the inquiry
encapsulated in the APA and original Chevron: Was the rule within the scope
of the agency’s authority under law?
Seminole Rock’s peculiar context offers reasons why the Court may have
been willing to defer to OPA’s interpretation. First, the case arose during
wartime and the decision at issue was part of a wartime measure to constrain
prices. Historically, government actions linked to engagement in war have
received greater deference—at least while the war is ongoing—than
peacetime measures.124 Second, deference to administrative interpretations
of price-control rules often was seen as constraining, rather than expanding,
administrative authority, as judicial adoption of prior constructions of a rule
served to bind the agency in future applications.125
These factors could help explain the Court’s uncritical acceptance of a
broadly stated rule of deference. However, the overwhelming reasons for its
embrace of the Administrator’s interpretation of the rule are its consistency
with the justices’ own reading combined with the simultaneous
announcement of the interpretation and adoption of the regulation, its
widespread and contemporaneous dissemination, and its consistent
application. The Court obviously would have reached the same result in
Seminole Rock with or without deference.126 That, together with the peculiar
facts of the case supporting deference, severely limit the credence that should
be given to the Court’s broadly stated deference rule.
4. Here’s to You, Mr. Robertson
The other case relied on to support Auer’s sweeping deference rule was
the Court’s decision in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, forty
years after Seminole Rock.127 The Auer Court did not really rely on
Robertson as much more than a carrier bringing Seminole Rock’s rule closer
in time. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Robertson, like Seminole Rock,
plainly reads as a decision based on the Court’s own reading of the law, not
on deference to administrative interpretation.
123. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417.
124. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 59–60; Nathaniel L. Nathanson,
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review, 9
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 60, 61–62 (1942); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 607 (2003). See generally Donald H.
Wallace & Philip H. Coomes, Economic Considerations in Establishing Maximum Prices in
Wartime, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1942).
125. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–58; Norem, supra note 104, at
702–04.
126. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 639.
127. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
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Robertson primarily concerns issues of statutory interpretation relating to
the National Environmental Protection Act’s (NEPA)128 meaning. The Court
painstakingly reviews the language of NEPA, its purposes, precedents
respecting its application, and the steps taken by the Forest Service to
implement it, in deciding whether the Service’s NEPA-mandated
“Environmental Impact Statement” sufficiently detailed plans for mitigating
environmental effects from allowing recreational uses of certain lands under
its control.129
Of the twenty-three pages covered by the opinions in the case, only two
pages address the related contention that the Forest Service also violated its
own regulations by failing to adopt a detailed mitigation plan.130 Justice John
Paul Stevens’s opinion for the Court explains the nature of the mitigation
steps proposed; rejects the contention that these steps are inadequately
detailed, at least with respect to environmental effects pertaining directly to
the site to be occupied and the entities using the site; and also declares that
nothing in the Forest Service rule should be read to require advance detailed
plans for mitigation of other effects.131 The final two sentences at the end of
this examination declare that the Service did not behave unreasonably in
interpreting its regulation to permit that result and add the quotation from
Seminole Rock that an agency interpretation that is not “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation” is controlling.132 As with Seminole Rock,
that addition was unnecessary to the Court’s conclusion.
In short, neither Seminole Rock nor Robertson turned on—and neither
required—the deference rule these decisions bequeathed to the Auer Court.
III. DEFERENCE, DELEGATION, AND AUER
The rule announced in Auer, and before that in Seminole Rock and
Robertson, was not just unnecessary to deciding those cases; it also lacks the
implicit connection to constitutional-structural imperatives that explain
Chevron and its eponymous test, at least in its original form. Examination of
the difference between the underpinnings of Auer and Chevron reveals the
real deficit of Auer’s rule.
A. Deference from Legislative Delegation
As explained in Part I and underscored at the beginning of Part II,
deference follows delegation. Deference to administrative decisions is not—
or at least should not be—predicated on judicial assessment of judges’
competence versus administrators’ capabilities with respect to a given
128. Id. at 336.
129. See id. at 336–56. The Court also considered the application of regulations from the
Council on Environmental Quality implementing NEPA requirements. Id. at 351–56. That
agency’s actions were not at issue in the question respecting deference to the Forest Service’s
interpretation of its own rule.
130. See id. at 357–59.
131. See id. at 357–58.
132. See id. at 359.
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decision.133 It should not flow from a sense that administrators will do a
good—or good enough—job at interpreting the law.134 Deference should not
be accorded to administrative judgments because administrators are more
responsive to political influence or more democratically accountable.135
Each of these considerations may be relevant to issues of governmental
design or academic reflection on its benefits, but these are not issues given
to the courts for free-form resolution. Instead, the essence of constitutional
construction is the assignment of functions to each level and branch of
government, dividing responsibility between federal and state governments
and among the three branches of the federal government.136 Courts properly
give deference to administrative decisions only when, and only so far as,
either constitutional or statutory provisions confer discretion on the president
or his subordinates.137
This limitation on deference to instances of legally conferred discretion,
as identified through judicial interpretations of governing legal texts, does
not necessarily justify Chevron’s canon on construing statutory silence or
ambiguity. Justice Stephen Breyer has argued often that silence or ambiguity
alone is insufficient to indicate legislative commitment of a matter to
executive discretion,138 and Justice Clarence Thomas has expressed strong
concern that the courts have been abdicating their constitutional duties
through excessive deference.139
Yet, Chevron’s canon, at least as initially presented, anchors deference in
a construction of statutory text that looks to the parameters of legislative
delegation. Agencies were to receive deference so far, and only so far, as
statutory commitments of authority are framed in ways consistent with that

133. But see, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 18, at 94.
134. But see, e.g., Diver, supra note 18, at 582–92.
135. But see, e.g., Pierce, supra note 18, at 397.
136. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 42, 45–51 (James Madison), NOS. 21–23, 78, 84
(Alexander Hamilton); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 4–5 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW,
FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 157–64 (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward Whelan eds., 2017);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 524, 536–47
(1969).
137. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1447–56 (2017); Cass, supra note 25, at 57–58;
Cass, supra note 76, at 1308–09; Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 712–13 (2007); Scalia, supra note 25, at 513–16; see also PHILIP
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 4–8 (2014); Byse, supra note 25, at 262–
65.
138. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–12 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986).
139. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–53 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing broad concerns over judicial failures to
police lines between constitutionally vested powers); Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1217–20
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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result.140 Chevron combined that notion with the observation that statutory
delegations of authority in broad, ambiguous, or incomplete instructions may
often be consistent with an implicit understanding that this confers additional
degrees of discretion beyond what a narrower, more focused, or more fully
articulated instruction would convey.141
B. Deference Without Delegation or Two-Level Delegation?
This Part takes up the questions that follow any effort to connect Auer to
Chevron. It asks, first, whether there could be a delegation-based explanation
for deference to agency rule interpretation. Second, after exploring the
concept of two-level delegation, it also asks how a statutory commitment of
discretionary authority to administrators could encompass both rule writing
and rule interpretation.
1. Non-Chevron Deference
Auer’s rule is markedly different from Chevron’s at its core. Whether it is
sensible in a given instance to read statutory ambiguity or silence as
indicating a legislative commitment of discretionary authority to another
branch can be debated.142
However, it is not open for debate how the statutory construction canon
reads in Auer’s context. Simply put, one cannot infer a congressional
delegation of discretionary authority to an agency from silence or ambiguity
in a rule adopted by the agency itself.
Moreover, an agency cannot delegate additional authority to itself. It
cannot create authority it otherwise lacked by adopting ambiguous or
incomplete regulations or conferring discretion on itself to interpret and
apply them as it sees fit. Contrary to a common assumption of the similarity
between Auer deference and Chevron deference,143 in the most crucial aspect
of deference as a corollary of delegated discretion, there can be no rule of
deference to agency decisions respecting agency rules that mirrors Chevron.

140. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
141. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995); Cass, supra
note 25, at 68–69; Scalia, supra note 25, at 520–21; see also supra notes 35–36, 78–81 and
accompanying text (discussing FCC spectrum allocation and licensing authority).
142. That is, indeed, the principal fault line in the debate over differences between original
Chevron and Chevron in practice. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597–98 (2009). See generally, e.g.,
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009);
Bednar & Hickman, supra note 137, at 1450–56; Beermann, supra note 59; Byse, supra note
25; Cass, supra note 76; Herz, supra note 25; Levin, supra note 75; Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 75; Pierce, supra note 75.
143. See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1454–58 (discussing and
criticizing common rationales for strong judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation); see also Healy, supra note 8, at 644–45, 649–51, 653–56 (discussing and
criticizing simple analogies of rationales for deference in Auer’s settings to reasons for
deference in Chevron-type settings).
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2. Finding Two-Level Delegation
This does not mean that there is no possible delegation-based explanation
for deference to agency rule interpretation. A statutory commitment of
discretionary authority to an administrator could encompass not only rule
writing but rule interpretation as well.144
Look back, for example, at the sort of discretion recognized in Webster v.
Doe and Chaney.145 Although both decisions concerned the exercise of
statutory discretion rather than rule interpretation, the deference appropriate
to the decision of the director of the CIA in Webster v. Doe or the FDA
Administrator in Chaney would have been identical if either administrator
had first adopted a rule to guide his exercise of discretion. Certainly, in
Justice Scalia’s and Justice O’Connor’s view, the statutes in each case, read
in light of the sorts of decisions at issue—in Webster v. Doe, personnel
decisions made in the context of national security concerns that the CIA
director was peculiarly well-positioned to understand and, in Chaney,
decisions respecting when to institute enforcement activity, a matter within
the understood discretion of the FDA—committed unreviewable discretion
to the administrators.146 Whether they exercised that discretion through caseby-case decisions without prior guidance or through decisions guided by a
prior rule should not matter.
The Webster v. Doe and Chaney decisions were predicated on notions of
delegation and separation of powers that combined functional and textual
approaches to drawing the line between what is committed to agencies and
what is within the purview of judges. Yet, the heart of the matter for
Chaney—and for Justice Scalia, at least, in Webster v. Doe—was the scope
of statutorily delegated discretionary authority (and the concomitant
limitations on judicial review). In the same vein, courts have sought to
determine the scope of discretion to interpret regulations reasonably
associated with statutory enactments and, thus, the deference owed from
courts.147
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission148 and Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,149 for
instance, followed this route to find statutory grants of discretion for
interpretation of regulations. In both cases, the Court anchored deference to
agency reading of regulations in the underlying congressional delegation of
responsibility over the subjects at issue.
144. For various visions of what such deference might entail, see, for example, Healy,
supra note 8, at 653–57; Manning, supra note 10, at 623; Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 365 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The
Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306–08 (2017). For another example,
see generally Monaghan, supra note 83.
145. See supra notes 37–56 and accompanying text.
146. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608–10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–38 (1985).
147. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8, at 650–57.
148. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
149. 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
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The Martin decision begins its analysis with a broad statement of the
reason to think that statutes’ commitment of policy discretion to agencies
often will encompass a degree of freedom to interpret rules: “Because
applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls
upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”150 After
examining the specific provisions and statements respecting the particular
division of authority between the Secretary of Labor, who enjoys rulemaking
and enforcement authority under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act), and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
which reviews departmental decisions under the Act, the Court said:
We conclude from the available indicia of legislative intent that Congress
did not intend to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act
regulations from the Secretary’s power to promulgate and enforce them.
. . . The Secretary’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is
subject to the same standard of substantive review as any other exercise of
delegated lawmaking power.151

Similarly, the BethEnergy decision, addressing the Secretary of Labor’s
authority under the Black Lung Benefits Act, restates the Court’s prior
observation that the prerequisite for deference under Chevron is the
delegation of authority to an administrative agency, particularly
policymaking authority.152 It then declares that “[a]s delegated by Congress,
then, the Secretary[ of Labor]’s authority to promulgate regulations ‘not . . .
more restrictive than’ the [rules adopted by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW)] interim regulations necessarily entails the
authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to promulgate”
new regulations based on a reasonable interpretation of what HEW’s rules
meant.153 Without that authority, it would have been difficult to see what
rulemaking discretion Congress could have accorded the Department of
Labor under the revised legal framework for combatting black lung disease
and compensating its victims.154
C. Limited Support for Expanded Delegation-Based Deference
That a case can be made for supporting expanded delegation-based
deference in some settings is far from persuasive support for a broad
deference rule. This Part explains why values that may provide justification
for the assignment of certain decisions to administrative agencies do not

150. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151.
151. Id. at 157–58.
152. BethEnergy, 501 U.S. at 696–97 (citing Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649
(1990)).
153. Id. at 698.
154. Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting, pointed out the difficulty with reading the law as
conferring any discretion on this score to the secretary. See id. at 707–13 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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justify the assumption that all statutory ambiguity indicates a legislative
commitment of policymaking discretion to administrators.
1. Supporting Expanded Deference
Martin and BethEnergy are consistent with finding a two-level delegation
of authority from Congress, as each decision references a possible statutory
basis for deference to rule interpretations that could overcome the basic
approach of the APA. However, neither decision rests its conclusion on a
compelling, straightforward reading of the law as delegating the sort of
discretion for interpretation of rules that the Court finds. Both cases blend
apparent assumptions that Chevron deference automatically extends to rule
interpretation with more careful explanations as to why the underlying
legislative scheme is consistent with that result. Justice Harry Blackmun’s
opinion for the Court in BethEnergy, for instance, moves directly from
recapitulating the bases for Chevron deference in reviewing administrative
regulations to the assertion that the same considerations necessarily apply to
the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of already adopted rules in
BethEnergy (rules adopted a decade earlier by a different agency).155
Despite questions about the explanations in those cases, the instinct behind
Martin and BethEnergy is sound. When conferring authority on an agency
to exercise judgment on matters for which special expertise or experience is
critical, Congress certainly can grant administrators discretion (at least within
the parameters of constitutional permit).156 Technical, scientific, or
experiential judgments inform not only the way agencies frame regulations,
but the way they interpret and apply them as well.157 The same is true for
policy determinations calling on judgments about the best use of agency
resources or the best route to implement enforcement activities of the sort at
issue in Chaney.158 It is true as well for decisions necessarily based in
information that cannot be widely disclosed, as with the national security
considerations implicated in Webster v. Doe.
Assignment of these decisions to administrative discretion can be defended
in particular cases on the efficiency or democratic-legitimacy values
frequently used to justify broad delegations of authority to administrators.159
Those are the values often claimed to provide justification for Chevron
deference.160 Even Chevron skeptics admit that those values often align with
construction of particular statutes as delegating authority to administrators
155. See id. at 696–99.
156. For a discussion of constitutional limitations on delegation, see infra Part III.F.2.
157. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 83, at 736–37, 739–41.
158. For a discussion of the general case for commitment of similar managerial decisions
to administrators (in contrast with legislative-like determinations), see, for example,
HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 4, 83–110.
159. See generally, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); Diver, supra note 18; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18;
Mashaw, supra note 18; Pierce, supra note 18.
160. See generally, e.g., Breyer, supra note 138; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18;
Pierce, supra note 75; Pierce, supra note 18; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 144.
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and with the further inference that statutory silence or ambiguity is consistent
with delegation of discretionary authority for specific administrative officials
to make decisions within the confines of the law.161
Those same values can cohere with statutory construction of delegated
discretionary authority over interpretation and implementation of rules. The
authority granted, for example, to the OPA Administrator in Seminole Rock,
is consistent with deference to determinations respecting the application of
the rule. Put aside the fact that the Court actually construed the law and
rule.162 If finding delegated discretion over the issue had mattered, this was
the perfect case for it. The issue was technical, the grant of authority over
prices was a wartime enactment (limited to and applied during wartime), and
experience in the assessment of contracts and pricing arrangements in a
particular line of business framed the interpretive issue in the case.163
In addition, the textual bases for deference in Seminole Rock lined up with
other considerations that have supported deference. The position taken was
one of long-standing, consistent application, starting contemporaneously
with adoption of the rule being construed, and not a “‘convenient litigating
position,’ or a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced . . . to defend past agency
action against attack.”164
2. Requirements for Finding Deference-Worthy Delegation
Although prodelegation values can buttress a reading of the law in specific
instances, such as the Price Control Act’s provision at issue in Seminole
Rock, as conferring discretion to implement rules, those values do not justify
an assumption that every statutory ambiguity signals a legislative
commitment of policymaking discretion to administrators to resolve the
ambiguity. That is not an adequate basis for construing statutes generally as
granting first-level delegations of broad rulemaking authority, and certainly
not an adequate basis for assuming that vague regulatory laws routinely
comprehend second-level delegations of discretionary rule-implementing
authority.
The Supreme Court’s “extraordinary case” or “major questions” canon of
statutory construction, as announced in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co.,165 rightly makes that point as a matter of first-level delegation:
161. See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 137, at 1447–56; Duffy, supra note 74, at
199. See generally, e.g., Beermann, supra note 59; Byse, supra note 25; Cass, supra note
25; Cass, supra note 76; Farina, supra note 25; Foote, supra note 137; Herz, supra note 25;
Walker, supra note 8. That is essentially the assessment made by the Court in Chaney, and
by Justices O’Connor and Scalia in Webster v. Doe.
162. See supra Part II.B.2.
163. See, e.g., Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 8, at 55–60; Norem, supra note 104,
708–10; see also Nathanson, supra note 124, at 61–62 (discussing the necessity for immediate
action in a war economy); Wallace & Coomes, supra note 124, at 99 (explaining the need for
price control efforts during wartime to be “capable of rapid and flexible operation”).
164. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (first alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
213 (1988); then quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
165. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes
an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit
delegation.166

Justice Scalia captured the same point more pithily in pointing out that
Congress was not likely to make major changes in the law surreptitiously.
That would have been the case if it were found to have delegated authority
to the FDA broadly to restrict sales of tobacco products (the issue in Brown
& Williamson) or to have delegated to the EPA broad discretion to weigh the
costs and benefits of ozone regulation and make determinations respecting
its permissibility on that basis (the issue in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns167). Writing for the Court in American Trucking, Scalia said:
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme
in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.”168
More generally, as already noted, justices on the Supreme Court—at times
a majority—have expressed strong concern about the breadth of the Chevron
assumption of delegated discretion (as it is applied). In addition to Justice
Thomas’s expansive objection to the Court’s abdication of their
constitutional responsibilities to interpret and apply legal texts that govern
resolution of the disputes before them,169 other justices—including Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer (among the eight-justice majority in United
States v. Mead Corp.170)—have supported requirements for deference that
demand additional indicia that Congress, enacting the relevant law, plausibly
committed discretionary authority consistent with deference.171 In addition,
Justices Kennedy and Alito joined with Chief Justice Roberts (dissenting in
City of Arlington v. FCC172) in arguing against deference to decisions on

166. Id. at 159.
167. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
168. Id. at 468.
169. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–20 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1240–53 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing concerns respecting
abdication of the Court’s responsibility to assure that constitutionally vested powers are not
delegated to or assumed by entities that are not authorized to exercise them).
170. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
171. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1003–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002);
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230–34; Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000).
In Christensen, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, limited the types of administrative
pronouncements qualifying for Chevron deference, an approach later reconfirmed in Mead.
For discussion of the differences among the approaches of the justices and cases on this score,
see, for example, Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527,
536–47 (2014).
172. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
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agency jurisdiction.173 Although the majority in City of Arlington embraced
Justice Scalia’s skepticism about courts’ ability to separate “jurisdictional”
questions from other issues of statutory authority,174 the majority plainly also
had doubts about the wisdom of assuming that Chevron deference should
apply whenever imprecise or incomplete statutory language could be
construed to grant administrators’ discretion.175
The justices’ skepticism over the application of Chevron is doubly
problematic for Auer deference. If something more than silence or ambiguity
is needed to ground an inference that Congress has conferred deferenceworthy discretion for agency rulemaking, it plainly follows that even more is
required to support a second level of deference to the agency’s interpretation
of its rule.176
D. Auer Deference’s Due Process Problems
In light of the preceding discussion, the underlying requirement for
deference to agency interpretations of agency rules, at a minimum, should be
some meaningful basis for concluding that Congress has in fact delegated
discretion over that determination to the agency.
That minimum
requirement, however, may not be enough. This section and the succeeding
section explore reasons for questioning the legitimacy of actual delegations
of authority over both rulemaking and rule interpretation or rule application.
Scholarly and judicial commentary has offered two principal reasons—
apart from logical inferences from the reservations discussed above
respecting broad application of “Chevronesque” deference—for concern
over deferring to agency rule interpretation even if there is evidence of a
congressional commitment of such authority.177 These are: (1) the conflict
between deference and structural or due process considerations respecting

173. See id. at 312–23 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 306 (majority opinion).
175. For data consistent with observations of the justices’ statements and decisions, see
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 82, at 1130–35 and see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834
F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Judge (now-Justice) Gorsuch,
in addition to writing the opinion for the court, wrote separately to express concern over the
Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence in terms that evoked considerations voiced by Justice
Thomas.
176. See, e.g., Professors’ Brief, supra note 102, at 16–17. A similar point is suggested by
Justices Scalia and Thomas in their concurrences in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, which
both noted the tension between the APA and deference to administrative rule interpretations
accomplished without notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas presents an even more basic objection to any deference: that it is an invasion of the
judicial role. See id. at 1224; see also infra Part III.E.2. But see Nielson, Beyond, supra note
8, at 964–82 (noting the availability of interpretation through adjudication as an alternative to
interpretive rulemaking).
177. Professor Walker has suggested that there are at least four significant arguments for
narrowing the scope of Auer deference. See Walker, supra note 8, at 107–10. The arguments
collected under this heading in his helpful review, however, include both analytical rationales
for Auer’s impropriety or illegality and proposed strategies for altering the deference doctrine
to limit problems associated with Auer deference.
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impartial adjudication; and (2) the conflict between deference and due
process considerations respecting fair notice. Both of these arguments
encompass suppositions about strategic behavior by agency officials as well
as analysis of appropriate procedures for applying rules.
1. Impartial Adjudication: Can the Rule Writer Decide?
The best-known challenge to Auer deference—although in fact pitched at
Seminole Rock, as it was published prior to the decision in Auer—is Professor
John Manning’s elaboration of a separation-of-powers concern which can
also be cast as a due process concern rooted in the requirement of an impartial
adjudicator.178 His article recalls the ideas, articulated by writers such as
Montesquieu, Locke, and Blackstone, that informed the framing of our
Constitution, particularly concerns with the aggregation of different powers
in one official or governmental body.179
Those concerns largely explain the division of powers in the national
government, separating lawmaking from law-interpretation and lawimplementation functions. The Vesting Clauses of the Constitution make
clear that Congress is responsible for making law, the executive branch for
implementing it, and courts for interpreting it as necessary to its application
in cases properly brought before them.180 While this oversimplifies a bit—
for example, the president participates in lawmaking through the requirement
of presentment and in some respects is empowered to take action in areas of
national security and international affairs even in the absence of specific
legislation181—it is a fair picture of the overall constitutional design.
Further, because the Constitution’s framers had special concerns over
lawmaking authority, the Constitution imposes onerous requirements on how
laws are made.182 They divided legislative power between two houses of
Congress with members chosen in different ways, at different times, for
different-length terms, representing differently composed constituencies, and

178. See generally Manning, supra note 10, at 631–54.
179. See id. at 640–48.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. The degree
to which conclusions about the scope of the powers delegated to each branch can be drawn
strictly from the Vesting Clauses is contested. Some scholars draw strong conclusions from
the Vesting Clauses themselves. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 22–43
(2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377
(1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). Others, however, contest those conclusions. See generally,
e.g., Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 467 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004). Nonetheless, the argument for understanding
them as actually dividing powers is overwhelming.
181. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
946–48 (1983); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936).
182. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James Madison).
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required bicameral agreement along with presentment of legislation to the
president for acceptance or veto.183
Yet, Professor Manning notes, Congress has effectively delegated
lawmaking power to administrators. As Manning frames it, Congress has
“delegated authority that gives agencies the right to promulgate statute-like
‘legislative rules’ under exceptionally open-ended statutory standards.”184
The result is that “important and binding specifics of legislation are defined
not through bicameralism and presentment, but through executive
policymaking, which occurs apart from the legislative process.”185
Because separation-of-powers considerations demand that lawinterpretation and law-implementation powers be divided from lawmaking,
Manning concludes that the exercise of lawmaking power by administrators
requires that administrators not enjoy the sort of control over interpretation
and implementation that the rule of Seminole Rock (and later Auer) grants.186
The combination of powers not only violates concerns that generally limit
officials to one type of power; it also provides incentives for officials to
augment their power through strategic behavior.187 Although officials will
not always want to adopt vague rules to preserve interpretive freedom
(doubtless wanting at times to bind successors), they will be more inclined to
choose imprecision than would have been the case without Auer
deference.188
Although Professor Manning’s critique is thoughtful and influential—it
has been picked up by others, notably by Justice Scalia189—it is too general
a response to Seminole Rock’s (and, more, Auer’s) flaws. First, while
logically Auer’s rule applies only to legislative-type rules, like Mead, it is not
limited to instances where agency rules have the force of law.190 Second,
and more significantly, some rules that do have the force of law do not give
rise to concerns about interpretation of the sort Manning identified. They do
not, that is, present likely difficulties with inappropriate expansion of
administrative power or likely inclination of interpretations toward results
that prejudice individuals or entities affected by agency rules.

183. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 7; THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton),
NOS. 48, 51 (James Madison).
184. Manning, supra note 10, at 652–53.
185. Id. at 653.
186. See id. at 654–57.
187. See id. at 659–60, 664–69.
188. See id. at 655–56, 659–60, 663–64.
189. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–23 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997); see also Christensen v. Harris
Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Michael Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking Domain
of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 579–80 (2002); Hickman, supra note 171, at
533; Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 352
(2003).
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On the latter point, it is helpful to start with the more general question of
combination of functions. Justice Scalia rightly observed in his dissenting
opinion in Mistretta v. United States191—which considered a challenge to the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission—that
administrators frequently are assigned functions that look very much like
adjudication or legislation, but that either of those functions is appropriately
assigned to administrators only as an adjunct of some executive function.192
In other words, the constitutional basis for administrators to engage in either
legislative-type rulemaking or court-like functions of interpretation and
dispute resolution must be the combination of one of these functions with
another function squarely in the executive’s domain.
In the same vein, James Madison recognized during the debates on
constitutional ratification that the division of authority over the three types
of power assigned to the three branches by the Vesting Clauses cannot be
perfectly captured by any verbal formula, or entirely separated among the
departments.193 Further, he defended the blending of functions in spots—as,
for example, with the president’s involvement in lawmaking or the Senate’s
participation in official appointments—as providing a salutary check on
excessive discretionary power in one branch of government.194
Professor Manning’s argument, in line with the arguments from Madison
and Scalia—and despite Manning’s invocation of more general separationof-powers arguments from philosophers—does not challenge all
combinations of functions as violating separation-of-powers strictures.
Instead, his more limited challenge to combining functions asserts that
allowing a rule writer to interpret rules is problematic because it
compromises the impartiality ideally required of interpreters and,
consequently, the incentives to be clear in the rules as well.195
Yet, even some combinations of exactly this sort seem unobjectionable.
As noted above, Seminole Rock is an example of facts that made it reasonable
to interpret the underlying law (the Price Control Act of 1942) as granting a
second level of discretion.196 The interpretive question at issue was narrow,
technical, and affected by experience associated with the work of the Office
of Price Administration.197 The issue also was one on which there was no
reason to expect the administrative decision makers to have a bias that would
call their interpretation into question—which among the alternative methods
for calculation of the price comparator was appropriate for the crushed stone
contracts and how the spacing of sales and delivery fit OPA’s rule were not
matters on which OPA should have been seen as an unfit umpire.
The same is true for some of the technical questions respecting appropriate
frequency separation, acceptable degrees of frequency overlap and signal
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

488 U.S. 361 (1989).
See id. at 413, 417–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 37, 47–51 (James Madison).
See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–48, 51 (James Madison).
See Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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attenuation, and other items that were important to early decisions on
spectrum allocation by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and FCC.198
Although important policy considerations were (perhaps wrongly) delegated
to administrators,199 there is no reason to expect that decisions on technical
issues were biased or that the FRC or FCC used interpretive judgments on
that portion of agency authority to expand their power or to prejudice
individual rights.200 Insofar as the concern is with biased interpretations, the
circumstances here, as in the Seminole Rock example, do not lend credence
to that basis for rejecting deference.
Ultimately, Professor Manning’s article presents a thoughtful objection to
the Seminole Rock-Auer doctrine, but the objection is sufficiently broad that
it must be judged an incomplete guide to when Congress should be able to
delegate second-level discretionary authority.
2. Fair Notice: Strategy and Due Process Concerns
A second objection to Auer deference, even for instances in which
legislation is consistent with a second level of deference to administrative
determinations, focuses on the opportunity that deference provides for
decisions that unfairly surprise those affected by a rule’s interpretation. This
concern has been voiced, for instance, by several justices. Justice Samuel
Alito, writing for a five-justice majority in Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp.,201 refused to grant Auer deference on the ground that the
Department of Labor had changed position after the grant of certiorari in a
manner that failed to give fair notice of the new interpretation of its rule:
[T]he DOL’s interpretation of ambiguous regulations [would] impose
potentially massive liability on respondent for conduct that occurred well
before that interpretation was announced. To defer to the agency’s
interpretation in this circumstance would seriously undermine the principle
that agencies should provide regulated parties “fair warning of the conduct

198. On the nature of early radio allocation and licensing decisions, see generally, 1 ERIK
BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
199. See generally, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1959); Thomas Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Glen O. Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation: The
Administrative Process and the Problems of Institutional Reform, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1179
(1969).
200. In this regard, technical judgments by the administrators stand in marked contrast to
their manipulation of other considerations on frequency allocation and licensing. See, e.g.,
RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 861–72 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the Cowles saga). See
generally, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why
Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998); Glen O. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L.
REV. 169 (1978).
201. 567 U.S. 142 (2012).

564

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

[a regulation] prohibits or requires.” Indeed, it would result in precisely the
kind of “unfair surprise” against which our cases have long warned.202

Although the Court subsequently made clear in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n203 that concerns over unfair surprise did not justify imposition of new
procedural requirements on agency interpretive statements, the justices also
reserved the prospect of using that consideration as a freestanding basis for
rejecting Auer deference in specific cases, as it had in Christopher.204
Concerns that Auer deference might permit unfair surprise through
changes in interpretation have been linked to assumptions that administrators
might consciously introduce ambiguity in their regulations to increase the
ambit of their own interpretive authority.205 This argument includes
apprehension that administrators could manipulate the content of rules in
ways that elide statutory controls over process (such as generally applicable
APA requirements) and prejudice those who deal with agencies.206
In this vein, Justice Thomas, for example, observed that allowing “an
agency to issue vague regulations . . . maximizes agency power and allows
the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”207 Similarly, Justice
Alito, citing Justice Scalia, declared that Auer deference “creates a risk that
agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can
later interpret as they see fit, thereby ‘frustrat[ing] the notice and
predictability purposes of rulemaking.’”208 Justice Scalia also opined that
giving deference to agency interpretations “allows the agency to control the
extent of its notice-and-comment-free domain,” adding that “[t]he APA does
not remotely contemplate this regime.”209
The fear that administrators, aware of Auer’s import, will purposely frame
substantive rules in vague terms to expand opportunities for discretionary
judgment later on is easily overstated. Political appointees, who generally
have decision-making authority on such things, most often have a decidedly
202. Id. at 155–56 (2012) (citations omitted) (first quoting Gates & Fox Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986); then
citing Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007)). Justice Breyer,
joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, did not engage the point about
Auer deference directly but found the agency’s interpretation of its regulation consistent with
the statute and with several prior statements about the nature of certain sales and promotion
activities (points that related to the interpretive question at issue). See id. at 169–78 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
203. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
204. See id. at 1209; Christopher, 567 U.S. at 157–60. See generally Leading Case,
Administrative Procedure Act—Changing Interpretive Rules—Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, 129 HARV. L. REV. 291 (2015).
205. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 11–12; Manning, supra note 10, at 647–48, 655–
57; Nielson, Beyond, supra note 8, at 954; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1485–
86.
206. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 4–12.
207. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
209. Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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limited time horizon, and the likelihood that successors soon will have a
different view on policy issues severely diminishes incentives to leave much
discretion to future interpretation.210
Different incentives, of course, affect agency staff, who tend to be both
more entrenched and more important to the details of agency decisions than
often is recognized.211 This is the category of agency official most likely to
be interested in preserving discretion for the future.212
Even so, the impact of staff incentives is surely moderated by the
incentives of politically appointed superiors. Further, the prospect that
agency rulemaking will respond more than marginally to incentive effects
tied to rule writers’ appreciation of the legal rules on deference to agency rule
interpretation itself is questionable.213 Although studies have found some
degree of familiarity with deference rules, the relevant decision makers are
apparently far more familiar with Chevron than Auer and far more likely to
take account of the former in framing regulations.214
Moreover, in contrast to the situation with legislation, there is relatively
little likelihood that administrators will gain significant benefit from using
opaque language to defer or mask politically difficult decisions. Officials
who run for elected office and who need support from diverse constituencies
often have strong reasons to avoid clear statements of position.215 However,
in general, ambiguity in administrative rules is apt to be the product of less
clear appreciation of future problems or less clear focus on the meaning of
words chosen than of deliberate attempts to preserve discretion for later
decisions.
Questions about the fit between use of interpretive guidance and APA
rulemaking—often conjoined with arguments about Auer’s contribution to
risks of abrupt shifts in agency positions without appropriate signaling to the
public—are serious matters. APA rulemaking requirements are designed to
provide notice and to shape consideration of rules’ effects in ways that
facilitate clearer drafting and better advance notice to the public than more

210. For similar points respecting administrators’ incentives regarding future agency
determinations, see, for example, Manning, supra note 10, at 656 and see generally Jack M.
Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285 (2013);
Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2018).
211. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 200, at 185–87, 216–19; James Q. Wilson, The Dead
Hand of Regulation, 25 PUB. INT., Fall 1971, at 39, 48, cited in Robinson, supra note 200, at
217.
212. Anyone who has served in government as a political appointee has had the experience
of longtime staff suggesting language for decisions designed to preserve agency prerogatives
(including appeals to agency discretion in litigation). The pattern of permanent employees
designing around short-term political agency heads is not limited to the U.S., as evidenced by
the British comedy Yes, Minister.
213. See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 144, at 309.
214. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999, 1059–66 (2015).
215. See generally, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and
Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555 (1972).
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casual methods of decision-making associated with other vehicles for
formulating and announcing interpretive judgments.216
Use of other methods for providing guidance is certainly permitted, even
when changing course on agency policy,217 but agencies at times change
interpretations of legal requirements in ways that are neither well-grounded
in legal texts nor accomplished in ways that are designed to provide adequate
notice to affected individuals and entities.218 The Department of Education’s
change in interpretation of a Title IX regulation respecting segregation of
school bathroom and locker room facilities by sex—using a private letter
ruling to dramatically alter a rule that was not ambiguous, some four decades
after its adoption—provided a particularly striking example.219
Certainly, when failure to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking
processes results in ill-considered judgments or interpretive shifts that lack
sufficient signaling to those directly affected by agency rules, courts should
(and do) have tools to prevent the most unfortunate effects of those
procedural deficits.220 The issues relevant to these determinations, however,
are not whether deference to agency interpretations for which there is
delegated discretion is generally unlawful but whether specific
determinations fail to meet legal requirements either of process or substance.
The “fair notice” objection is apposite in particular instances, as it was in
Christopher,221 and failure to meet APA requirements, absent an applicable
statutory exception, would prevent a conclusion that there was in fact
delegated discretion in a given setting.
On balance, as with the objection predicated on combination-of-functions
concerns, while the “fair notice” argument contains insights about the impact
deference to administrative rule interpretation has on important values, it
does not provide a basis for across-the-board rejection of a second level of
deference to administrative decisions.
E. Auer’s Iterated Delegation Problem: First Cuts
The conclusion that Congress can delegate discretion over the
implementation of law—including discretion over policy judgments framed
by statute and determinations relevant to elaboration of policy judgments
encapsulated in already-adopted rules—does not compel a conclusion that
216. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 17–18; Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson,
Rulemaking “Due Process”: An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 231–32
(1981). See generally, e.g., James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of
Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
217. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202–07 (1947).
218. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 252–55; Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 153–55 (2012).
219. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 737 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
220. See, e.g., Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1209.
221. See Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154–60.
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Congress has, in any given instance, done so. So, too, finding that neither of
the two commonly voiced arguments against the constitutionality of
delegating second-level discretionary authority can bear the weight
advocates suggest for them does not mean that all delegations of second-level
interpretive authority are constitutionally permissible.
Thus, two remaining questions are: When should courts find that a statute
includes a delegation of second-level discretionary authority? And, what
principles limit congressional authority to make such delegations? Both the
institutional bias-partiality argument first advanced by Professor Manning
and the fair notice argument articulated in Christopher provide partial
answers to the second question. As explained below, these arguments join
more general concerns over delegation of authority to suggest answers to
both of these questions.
1. Assumptions’ Insufficiency: Ambiguity and Expertise
Although the settings differ in important ways, the impulse Auer
represented was the same as that underlying Chevron: seeing an ambiguous,
unclear, or incomplete statutory instruction as sufficient indication that
Congress intended (and actually delegated authority for) administrators to
resolve the ambiguity or complete the legislation reflects the same
assumption about legislation. It assumes that legislators knowingly arrive at
compromises that fail fully to account for decisions that need to be made for
laws to be effective and would prefer that those further decisions be made by
officials who are more politically accountable instead of by judges, who are
insulated against political influence.222 Even vigorous advocates of this
supposition, however, have recognized that it is merely a fiction in respect of
statutory ambiguity.223 How much more of a fiction would it have to be to
suggest an intent to delegate a second level of discretionary authority?
Further, while Justice Scalia, among others, for many years defended
Chevron’s assumption that ambiguity in statutory commitment of authority
to an agency carries with it discretionary authority within the domain of that
ambiguity,224 he coupled that interpretive canon with a decided willingness
to examine particular statutory language and pronounce its meaning,
notwithstanding administrators’ opinions.225 This made Scalia’s version of
Chevron closer than might otherwise appear to that of Justice Breyer and
222. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 25, at 516–17 (explaining Chevron); see also Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 82, at 1103 (explaining Seminole Rock-Auer deference as based in a similar
delegation of lawmaking authority).
223. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 25, at 517.
224. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 549–53 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–91 (2000); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996); Scalia, supra note 25, at 516.
225. See generally Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005–20 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714–36
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994);
Cass, supra note 13, at 287–88.
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other justices who demand particularized evidence of delegated discretion.226
On either Scalia’s or Breyer’s vision of Chevron, quite a bit more than
statutory ambiguity should be needed to support the extended discretion
associated with Auer.227
As with ambiguity alone, it should not suffice that the matter over which
administrative discretion is claimed can be cast as technical, narrow, or best
resolved by reference to experiences and analytical capabilities that lie more
in administrators’ than in judges’ hands. These factors make a delegation of
discretionary authority less objectionable as a matter of policy,228 but they
do not constitute evidence that the authorities who must make such a
delegation—elected officials given power to frame legislation through
specified constitutional mechanisms—have made that choice.229
The legislature’s commitment of discretion over rule implementation is
unlikely to be clearly formalized in an express statutory statement, although
at times statutory language will come close to that, as it did in the provision
of the National Security Act at issue in Webster v. Doe.230 Absent that, courts
should demand something beyond a surmise that laws necessarily commit all
technical questions or all experiential or complicated issues to
administrators’ discretion. Unusually broad legislative assignments of
authority, such as those embodied in the FCC’s spectrum allocation
authority231 or the Office of Price Administration’s authority underlying
Seminole Rock, provide one indication.232 Matters historically treated as
within the executive’s discretion—based in constitutional authorization (as
with some national security decisions233) or in the sort of interrelated
resource and policy considerations at issue in exercises of prosecutorial
discretion234—also can support deference.
The availability of indicia of deference in some instances, however, does
not save, or even soften concerns over, Auer’s rule. The gap between the
general assumption of delegated discretion at the heart of Auer and the
legitimate realm for fact-based conclusions respecting delegations of second226. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545
U.S. at 1003–04 (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–34 (2001); Breyer, supra note 138, at 370.
See generally Hickman, supra note 171 (discussing the overlap in the justices’ views on
requirements for deference).
227. See, e.g., Professors’ Brief, supra note 102, at 12–20.
228. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 10, at 616–17; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 83,
at 754 (arguing that administrative expertise should be the primary basis for granting
deference). See generally, e.g., Diver, supra note 18; Mashaw, supra note 18; Pierce, supra
note 18.
229. But see Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO
Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL. 199, 222–23 (2000).
230. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
232. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–16 (1945).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936).
234. See supra notes 56, 145–46 and accompanying text. See generally Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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level interpretive authority is fatal to Auer as written. Moving beyond Auer
to evidence-based assessments of delegation, construction of particular
statutory commitments of second-level interpretive authority should be
parsimonious—not only for the combination of functions and fair warning
reasons discussed above235 but also because some delegations, even of a first
level of discretionary authority, raise serious constitutional problems.
2. Deference as Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Power
Justice Thomas has advanced one version of this argument, by asserting
that any deference to administrative interpretation of either regulations or
statutory requirements permits administrators to exercise judicial power
constitutionally reserved to Article III judges. Concurring in the judgment
in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Thomas begins by reviewing the
history, philosophical pedigree, importance, and constitutional embodiment
of both separation of powers and interbranch checking principles.236
Applying those principles from the Seminole Rock-Auer deference rule, he
states:
[T]he Judiciary, insulated from both internal and external sources of bias,
is duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying the law.
. . . Just as it is critical for judges to exercise independent judgment in
applying statutes, it is critical for judges to exercise independent judgment
in determining that a regulation properly covers the conduct of regulated
parties. Defining the legal meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that
determination.
Seminole Rock deference, however, precludes judges from
independently determining that meaning. . . . That deference amounts to a
transfer of the judge’s exercise of interpretive judgment to the agency.237

Justice Thomas’s argument forcefully and appropriately articulates the
tension between Auer’s expansive, general deference principle and principles
underlying fundamental aspects of constitutional structure. His “no
deference” argument goes beyond the specific combination-of-functions
contentions made by Professor Manning and the “fair notice” objection
raised by others.238 Rather than anchoring his opposition to deference in
notions of due process, Thomas’s claim rests on constitutional assignments
of power and their relation to more basic concepts of liberty. His argument
recognizes that judicial review serves as a valuable check on abuse of
legislative and executive power and links to other concerns that deference
undermines important constitutional governance features.239

235. See supra Part III.D.
236. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–17 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Id. at 1219.
238. See id.
239. For similar discussions regarding constitutional governance structures and separation
of powers, see, for example, HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 4–8, 334–45, 378–85; Byse,
supra note 25, at 261; Cass, supra note 25, at 57–58; Cass, supra note 76, at 1301–03.
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The strong version of the “no deference” argument, however, conflicts
with other aspects of a constitutional system that accepts—indeed,
embraces—the blending of functions in some respects, on the one hand, and
the mandated separation of powers, on the other.240 The federal courts have
sole authority to exercise the judicial power of the United States, which
encompasses “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution,
[and] Laws of the United States,”241 but that grant of power did not create
specific causes of action in law or equity.242 For that reason, courts long
have understood the Constitution as permitting assignments of decisional
authority that are insulated from judicial scrutiny. So, for example, cases
such as Chaney and Webster v. Doe reveal reasons why Congress might
properly, and constitutionally, delegate unreviewable discretion to
administrators.243
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court has recognized congressional
prerogatives to shape the jurisdiction of federal courts, subject to a few
limiting rules (such as the definition of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction).244 The degree to which questions potentially within the federal
judicial power can be put outside the reach of Article III courts—not through
formal assignment to another body but through limited grants of jurisdiction
to Article III courts—is contested, with thoughtful scholars expressing a
range of divergent views.245 Despite differences over the exact extent to
240. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 37, 47–51 (James Madison).
241. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
242. The line of cases associated with the oxymoronically named Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), stands as a doctrinally
unfortunate exception to this understanding, much narrowed in the past thirty-plus years. See,
e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring), cited in
James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 275, 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2010); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers
of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (1985). See generally, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1731 (1991); James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy
and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009).
243. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
244. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1973); Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512–14 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–75 (1803); see also Paul M. Bator,
Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1038
(1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005–
06 (1965).
245. For varied views of required federal court jurisdiction, see generally, for example,
Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Akhil R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article
III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); William A. Fletcher, Congressional Power over the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Meaning of the Word “All” in Article III, 59 DUKE L.J.
929 (2010); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
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which Congress is free to control federal courts’ jurisdiction, however, the
strong consensus is that Congress’s control (at least as to the jurisdiction of
lower courts) is extensive if not unlimited. Restricting options for review by
controlling the courts’ jurisdiction is essentially equivalent to granting
unreviewable discretion in a world where federal courts otherwise enjoy
general review authority over a set of questions respecting federal law—
which constitutes a broader delegation of authority to administrators than that
assumed in deference rules.
The same understanding of options for Congress by law to grant discretion
to administrators beyond the purview of courts also underlies the Court’s
second decision in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery II).246 Chenery II recognized administrators’ authority to make
decisions that have retroactive effect without first adopting a general rule,
much as common law courts’ decisions over time produce cognizable rules
based on experience with concrete problems.247 The rule of Chenery II
suggests that delegating unreviewable discretion is equally consistent with
permitting case-by-case exercises of discretion as with exercise of discretion
over rule-based policy choices.248
It is also consistent with recognizing congressional power to confer a
second level of discretionary authority, not just a single level, on
administrators. After all, if Congress can remove a category of decision from
judicial review, then it can, in most circumstances, permit the discretion to
be exercised as the legislators see fit (including through more expansive,
more deferentially reviewed administrative authority over interpretation),
which is a corollary of a legislatively delegated power.249 At least,
constitutional objection to these delegations must be based on more than the
manner in which deferring to exercises of discretion intrudes on the judicial
power to “say what the law is.”250

Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and
Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990); Lawrence
G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Julian Velasco,
Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671 (1997).
246. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
247. See id. at 202–07.
248. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. See generally Nielson, Beyond,
supra note 8.
249. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 83, at 15–17, 26–28, 32–33; Rao, supra note 20, at
1504–06. See generally Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper”
Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005). Of course,
this does not mean that the assertion of a specific constitutional protection, such as due
process, can be elided simply by legislating a particular procedural requirement. See, e.g.,
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 154–60 (2012); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733–36 (1877). Instead, the point is that within the ambit of otherwise
constitutionally permitted authorizations, the mere fact that Congress has chosen a process
that reduces the ambit of judicial supervision is not enough to demonstrate its invalidity.
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Without taking anything away from its core concern respecting
interference with constitutionally assigned and separated functions, the
broadest form of the deference-as-interference-with-judicial-power thesis
requires too much revision of constitutional understandings that fit the
language, history, and structure of the Constitution.
F. Auer’s Larger Iterated Delegation Problem:
Delegation of Legislative Power
While the strong version of the objection to deference in Justice Thomas’s
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n concurrence is overly broad, his call to link
deference analysis to the Constitution’s basic structural features and to
skeptically view legal doctrines and statutory schemes in tension with those
structural features is important. It connects to a fundamental problem that
has eroded critical constitutional protections against excessive, unchecked
discretionary power: the abandonment of serious judicial efforts to keep
delegation of authority to administrators within constitutional bounds.251
1. The Base Delegation Problem
The Constitution’s framers recognized that the primary functions of
government assigned to the three branches of the national government—
legislative, executive, and judicial—could not be exactly defined or
hermetically insulated from the functions committed to other branches.252
Yet, as best articulated by Madison, the framers even more firmly believed
that keeping each branch to its own functions—keeping one branch from
expanding its remit into territory constitutionally committed to one of the
other branches—was critical to protecting liberty.253 The branches did not
enjoy authority to exercise the power committed to another branch—the
courts and executive branch, for example, could not make law, nor could the
legislative branch reserve to itself the authority to implement the law—but
each branch could exercise some control over other branches’ actions in ways
that would reduce prospects of one impinging on another branch’s domain.254
This limitation on officials in any one branch going awry, straying over
the constitutional lines, includes judicial restraint on Congress delegating
powers where they do not belong, especially delegating the lawmaking
authority Congress was empowered to exercise—only in a constitutionally
prescribed manner, including presentment to the president.255 Chief Justice
251. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring); id. at 1240–41, 1253–55 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See
generally Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot, supra note 21; Cass, supra note 20; Lawson,
supra note 20; Rao, supra note 20; Schoenbrod, Substance, supra note 20.
252. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 37, 47–51 (James Madison).
253. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
254. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 73, 78 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 48, 51 (James
Madison).
255. See generally Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot, supra note 21; Cass, supra note
20; Lawson, supra note 20; Rao, supra note 20; Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra
note 20.
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John Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Wayman v. Southard256 explained
the line between permissible and prohibited delegations. Wayman concerned
the Process and Compensation Act of 1792 (and, in passing, also the
Judiciary Act of 1789), which provided courts authority to modify the forms
used for writs and execution of process in particular circuit or district
courts.257 Courts generally (and historically) control procedural details for
the manner in which litigation will proceed. The 1789 and 1792 laws set
some basic rules for procedures to be used in federal courts but allowed
federal courts to modify those rules and left many details to the judges.258
The Court in Wayman distinguished decisions on “important subjects, which
must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself”259 from the modest degree
of control over what was essentially a matter of judicial administration (a
“subject[] . . . of less interest”260) on which Congress could legislate in
general terms while leaving administrators discretion over the details.261
Justice Scalia’s Mistretta opinion described the practical import of the
restriction on delegation and followed essentially the same logic as Madison
and Marshall.262 Scalia explained that the exercise of executive power at
times requires adjudicative methods very similar to those of courts and at
other times calls for elaboration of guiding precepts in ways that look much
like legislative rulemaking.263 Yet, accepting the propriety of these actions
is a far cry from saying that administrators or courts can exercise Congress’s
lawmaking power or that administrators can exercise judicial power in place
of courts.
For Justice Scalia, the constitutional structure requires both that executive
or judicial actions redolent of other powers are undertaken in the exercise of
powers firmly within those branches’ domains and that the scope of such
actions is set by law:
The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its
responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or
judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or
generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to a point—how
small or how large that degree shall be.264

Where officials exercise powers properly assigned to them, they may at
appropriate times exercise ancillary powers such as making rules or
adjudicating their implementation.265
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
See id. at 41–50.
See id. at 39–44, 48–50.
Id. at 43.
Id.
See id. at 42–46.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417–19 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 417.
See id. at 417–19.
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2. Failures of Enforcement: Nondelegation’s Open Door
Although the Supreme Court generally has been faithful to the MadisonMarshall-Scalia understanding of separated powers when it comes to
purported exercises of judicial power outside Article III’s framework,266
delegation of lawmaking authority has been broadly, and improperly,
allowed.267 After announcing the “intelligible principle” test for permissible
delegations in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States268—which allows
statutory assignments of administrative authority that are guided by an
intelligible principle—the Court has only twice (and not since 1935) found
that congressional delegations of authority failed to articulate a sufficiently
constraining directive.269
Treating this test as an open door has given rise to a Code of Federal
Regulations that now contains somewhere in the neighborhood of 200,000
pages of legally enforceable, agency-generated rules, roughly nine to ten
times as many pages as the congressionally passed laws collected in the
United States Code.270 These rules go well beyond the sort of modest
controls over process that were at issue in Wayman or matters such as
management of personnel or resources within the government’s control that
were commonly delegated to executive officers in earlier eras.271 Indeed,
today’s administrative rules regulate facets of almost every business and a
multitude of individual activities; such rules govern how students and parents
interact with schools,272 how consumer goods are advertised and purchases
266. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). But see Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 847–59 (1986); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51–54 (1932).
267. For illustrative decisions, see, for example, Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–79; Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420–23 (1944); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
214–18, 225–26 (1943). Critical commentary includes, for example, Alexander & Prakash,
Running Riot, supra note 21; Cass, supra note 20; Christopher DeMuth, Can the
Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121 (2016); Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475 (2016);
Lawson, supra note 20; Lawson, supra note 249; Rao, supra note 20; Schoenbrod, Separation
of Powers, supra note 20.
268. 276 U.S. 394, 404 (1928).
269. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–76 (2001) (holding that
section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act “fits comfortably within the scope of discretion
permitted by our precedent”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
270. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Staying Agency Rules: Constitutional Structure and Rule
of Law in the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 228 (2017) (citing CLYDE WAYNE
CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY STATE 65 (2016), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202016%20-%20May%204%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VG6E-UW9K], and Wayne Crews & Ryan Young, Twenty Years of NonStop Regulation, AM. SPECTATOR (June 5, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://spectator.org/
articles/55475/twenty-years-non-stop-regulation [https://perma.cc/3BVA-EWDB]).
271. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 111–28; Alexander & Prakash, Running
Riot, supra note 21, at 1039–41; Cass, supra note 20, at 155–58, 168–70.
272. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 98.4 (2018) (establishing a student’s right to not be evaluated or
examined without prior consent); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2018) (establishing the right to a free,
appropriate, public education for all children, including children with disabilities).
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financed,273 how employers and employees communicate,274 and almost
anything else one can think of—a far cry from the limited set of decisions
initially thought appropriate for administrative and executive officials.275
While much government rulemaking utilizes procedures that can facilitate
more thoughtful, well-considered, and well-crafted rules,276 no process can
guarantee the quality of the regulations produced. More important, no
administratively generated rule is adopted through the mechanisms
specifically required for lawmaking by the Constitution: votes by both
houses of Congress (differently constituted to represent different sorts of
constituent interests for differently sized, selected, and temporally situated
voting groups) and presentment to the president.277 These are the procedures
that the Constitution’s framers deemed essential to national lawmaking.278
Without them, the resulting rules are extraconstitutional and lack both legal
legitimacy and the essential elements that supported cession of power to the
national government.279
Although lawyers, judges, and commentators have grown accustomed to
the devolution of lawmaking authority on unelected administrators,
Professors Larry Alexander and Sai Prakash provide a litany of potential
delegations that are laughably far from what any reasonable jurist would
accept but analytically comparable to the sort of delegations tolerated
today.280 The fact that Alexander and Prakash’s examples at first blush seem
so evidently anticonstitutional, and that the great bulk of actual delegations
of lawmaking authority do not, is evidence of the legal profession’s ability to
273. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing the FTC to prohibit any “unfair or
deceptive act” that affects commerce); 12 C.F.R. § 1022 (2018) (establishing the Fair Credit
Reporting Act).
274. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 100.530 (2017) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals
with handicaps from any program or activity conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board); 29 C.F.R. § 500.70 (2017) (outlining protections for migrant and seasonal workers).
275. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254–55 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 499 (2010); Cass, supra note 20, at 155–58, 182–93; DeMuth, supra note 267, at 125–
26; Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 267, at 491–93; Lawson, supra note 20, at 335–43, 360–
67, 399–403.
276. See, e.g., Richard K. Berg, Re-Examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between
Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163–64 (1986); William V. Luneburg,
Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 129; Gillian E. Metzger,
Foreword: The 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1,
78–82 (2017). See generally, e.g., DeLong, supra note 216; Shapiro, supra note 216.
277. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 7; THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS.
48, 51 (James Madison).
278. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 48, 51 (James
Madison).
279. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring); THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 45–51 (James Madison); WOOD, supra note 136, at 541–62; Manning, supra
note 10, at 640–44; John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 191, 202
(2007); Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1010–13 (2015).
For similar views respecting historic limitations on delegation under the law of England, see,
for example, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *303; A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 53–54 (9th ed. 1952).
280. See Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot, supra note 21, at 1054–64.
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accept and rationalize whatever set of decisions and practices have become
the norm.281
Common rationalizations for delegated lawmaking authority provide scant
reason for applauding the profession’s analytical prowess. Despite the
existence of serious arguments for preferring delegations on policy
grounds,282 arguments justifying the broad run of existing delegations of
lawmaking often are thin reeds on which to rest.
For one, acceptance of delegations of lawmaking power should not be
predicated on the nostrum that delegations, whether intended or inferred,
come “at the expense of [Congress] ceding control over the particulars of its
program to another branch of government.”283 That assumption—which
gives comfort that Congress would not be giving up control over anything of
importance—has been engaged to some extent by jurists and scholars who
are among the most thoughtful and discerning advocates of critical structural
analysis of constitutional issues, often in the context of explaining
differences between Chevron deference and Auer deference.284
It manifestly is not the case, however, that delegations of authority from
Congress are primarily acts of charity or means by which members of
Congress selflessly give up control to others. Instead, each delegation
performs functions that are useful to those who support it, not least members
of Congress who gain from avoiding the appearance of responsibility for
particular determinations or from acquiring more individual power because
they can influence the relevant set of administrative decisions more than the
details of related legislative enactments.285
In the same vein, many other contentions that delegations of lawmaking
authority should be embraced—because they are essential to modern
281. See generally, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition,
Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE
RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth E.
Himma eds., 2009); Ronald A. Cass, Quality and Quantity in Constitutional Interpretation:
The Quest for Analytic Essentials in Law, 46 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 183 (2018); Harry H.
Wellington, The Importance of Being Elegant, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 427, 430–34 (1981).
282. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 159, 175–81. See generally, e.g., Diver, supra note
18; Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18; Mashaw, supra note 18; Metzger, supra note 276,
at 71–89; Pierce, supra note 18.
283. Manning, supra note 10, at 653.
284. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “Congress cannot enlarge its own power
through [delegations that result in Chevron deference]—whatever it leaves vague in the statute
will be worked out by someone else”); Manning, supra note 10, at 653 (making a similar
argument).
285. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 66 (1982); Cass, supra note 20, at 153–55;
Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 45 (1982); Rao, supra note 20, at 1478–82. See generally, e.g.,
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of
Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947 (1999); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policies: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.
431 (1989); Shepsle, supra note 215.
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government,286 are not clearly barred by direct constitutional text,287 or are
cabined by procedural requirements288—should be seen as little more than a
fig leaf covering constitutional expansionism. The point is not that
prodelegation contentions are frivolous or thoughtless; rather, it is that they
pull away from the structure embedded in the Constitution. The requirement
that the president “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”289 for
instance, is not a mandate to make law. Though it is used by some scholars
as a launch vehicle for the current administrative state,290 it appears in the
middle of a set of manifestly ministerial duties—between receiving
ambassadors and commissioning officers—and is anything but an
assignment of authority to substitute administrative lawmaking for the
painstakingly constrained and carefully constructed set of procedures
contained in Article I.291
3. Extending Delegations’ Downsides: Evading Constraint, Auer’s
Expansion, and Criminal Risks
The facts highlighted in the last section—that explanations for delegation
leave substantial room for constitutional questions respecting many
delegations’ legitimacy and that the practice of delegating (while reducing
the institutional role of Congress) permits specific members of Congress to
increase their individual influence over decisions—underscore the
importance of scrutinizing each delegation for consistency with
constitutional commands. That is true whether the delegation is of first-level
discretionary authority to implement statutory instructions or second-level
discretionary authority to further effectuate an agency’s effort to do that
through rulemaking.
Yet, further expanding discretionary authority, as Auer does, by extending
it to additional decisional steps should trigger special scrutiny, if for no other
reason than to assure that the authority comes in fact from legislative
direction rather than from the sort of “matryoshka doll”–style approach
embraced by Auer, which (like the Russian nesting dolls) permits each
delegation to lead to another one.292 While modern commentary sometimes
recalls explanations from Madison or Hamilton of the importance of
particular structural features of the Constitution for protection of liberty,
there is less often recognition that Madison’s and Hamilton’s arguments did
not represent the skeptical side of the debate over control of official power.
286. See generally Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 18; Mashaw, supra note 18.
287. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 87, 90–92 (2010); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002).
288. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 276, at 77–81; Pierce, supra note 18, at 408–10.
289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
290. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J.
1836, 1886–99 (2015); Metzger, supra note 276, at 79–85. See generally Pierce, supra note
18.
291. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
292. See, e.g., Professors’ Brief, supra note 102, at 6, 24.
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The framing generation was divided between those in the Federalist camp—
who thought those structural features sufficiently protected against
expanding national authority, especially concentrated discretionary
authority—and the anti-Federalist camp—which doubted that the
Constitution’s structures (or any structures for a sovereign national
government) could contain officials’ impulses to self-aggrandizement and
the potential for abuse of power that accompanies it.293
The concept of delegated power informed a central concern for both sides
of the debate over the Constitution and, indeed, for broader debates in the
framing generation.294 The conceit underlying the Federalist arguments was
that power was delegated to the national government from the people and
that the delegation to exercise power through specific structures would
protect against the arrogation and abuse of discretionary power that had
produced invasions of liberty elsewhere.295 Express commitment of power
to the president, the courts, or other officials generated controversies over
delegation from the days of the Marshall Court to the late 1930s, when
questions arose respecting subdelegation of the Secretary of Agriculture’s
responsibility to grant a hearing before setting permitted rates under the
Packers and Stockyards Act.296 The Morgan cases grappled with the degree
to which a cabinet officer could rely on subordinates to perform tasks for
him, with the Supreme Court first significantly constraining subdelegation
before ultimately sustaining an accommodation designed to signal greater
investment of personal review than the Secretary would give to a routine
matter.297
The issue presented by the Auer doctrine, in marked contrast to the
questions of subdelegation at issue in Morgan, involves an expansion of
power that will frequently be both surreptitious and in tension with basic
separation-of-powers notions. The difference between these contexts is
important. Subdelegation of the Morgan variety can raise due process issues,
similar to questions respecting partiality and predictability that underlie both
Professor Manning’s objection to Auer deference and the Court’s objection
293. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 136, at 548–53, 559; see also id. at 532–64.
294. See, e.g., id. (discussing the delegations of power to government and within
government); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 137, at 378–402 (discussing the same concerns
about delegation at the time of the Constitution’s framing and in both prior and subsequent
generations).
295. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 21–23, 73, 78, 84 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 10, 42,
45–51 (James Madison); WOOD, supra note 136, at 532–36, 539–42.
296. Compare J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404–11 (1928)
(discussing the constitutionality of a delegation of authority directly to the president), Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892) (same), Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–
48 (1825) (discussing the constitutionality of a delegation of authority to the Supreme Court
and other courts of the United States), and Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 382, 387 (1813) (holding that the legislature did not transfer its power to the
president by prescribing evidence upon which a law should go into effect), with Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14–22 (1938) (discussing the subdelegation issue of whether the
Secretary of Agriculture could delegate his power and authority under the Packers and
Stockyards Act to subordinate officials).
297. See generally United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
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in Christopher.298 But the vast run of subdelegations will not raise
significant issues.299 The text of the Constitution itself suggests recognition
that the president will delegate particular functions to assist him in
discharging his constitutional duties, framing the Take Care Clause in
purposely elliptical form (not directing the president to execute the laws
faithfully but to see that they are faithfully executed) and providing for
appointment of department heads and inferior officers (officials whose
principal functions will be carrying out tasks formally assigned to the
president).300
The construction of formally adopted agency rules, however, is more about
the expansion of government power and potential abuse of power than about
the mechanics of its exercise. It can impose burdens on individuals and
entities subject to the regulations and alter the impact of rules without the
sort of advance warning that notice-and-comment rulemaking is designed to
provide.301 Even with opportunities for subsequent judicial review, the
thumb on the scale that Auer deference provides can both prejudice outcomes
and incentivize adversely affected entities to capitulate rather than litigate
even when they have strong grounds to believe that the administrative
construction is inappropriate.302 Announcement that courts will set aside
administrative interpretations that change the meaning of a rule without fair
notice to those who must comply with it will ameliorate the effect of a
deference rule, but it will not fully—perhaps not even substantially—
eliminate those effects.
Another consideration, not often linked to Auer deference—the frequency
with which transgression of administrative rules provides grounds for
criminal punishment—adds extra weight to concerns about expanding
administrative power.303 The base concern is placing lawmaking authority
298. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–57 (2012). See
generally Manning, supra note 10.
299. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015); Christopher, 576
U.S. at 157–60. See generally, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
300. See Cass, supra note 20, at 178–79 (discussing the Vesting Clause and Advice and
Consent Clause of Article II, as well as the Incompatibility Clause of Article I, of the U.S.
Constitution).
301. That concern certainly has been expressed repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1209; id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
1217–24 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Christopher, 567 U.S. at 157–60; Talk
Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
302. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 270, at 250–56; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Placing the
Clean Power Plan in Context, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/10/placing-the-clean-power-plan-in-context/
[https://perma.cc/B48A-8H3H]; Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-cleanpower-plan/ [https://perma.cc/QR8B-BYW4].
303. Cf. Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and OverFederalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 31, 32–35 (2013) [hereinafter Over-Federalization
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that can be the basis for the most significant, coercive, government power in
the hands of administrators who are not elected, do not need to go through
the rigors of bicameral legislative procedures, and do not require presentment
to and agreement from the president. It is difficult to find a place in our
constitutional structure for such authority.304
Further, enabling creation or alteration of criminally enforceable
requirements through administrative processes effectively lowers the bar to
creation of criminal liability. Beyond its tension with constitutional
commands, this procedural change makes the body of rules much larger.305
That not only expands bases for criminal liability, it also increases the
likelihood that those who are affected by the law will be caught (reasonably)
unaware of the law’s commands,306 that many more criminally punishable
transgressions, hence, will occur,307 and that enforcers’ discretion will be
greatly expanded (given the much larger realm of potential enforcement
actions and the probability that enforcers’ resources will not expand
commensurately).308
This complex of concerns suggests a further reason to demand, at a
minimum, clear commitment of legislated discretion over interpretation and
application of rules as a predicate for judicial deference. In contrast to Auer’s
rule of deference based on regulatory ambiguity, this approach should
channel deference into limited areas where it fits legitimate statutory
commitment of authority to administrators.

Hearing] (statement of John G. Malcolm, Rule of Law Programs Policy Director, Heritage
Foundation); Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE, July 2014, at 14, 14–15, 18–19; James A.
Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 6–11,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of
_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AEA-7V4T]. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
304. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 303, at 18–19.
305. See generally, e.g., CREWS, supra note 270; Cass, supra note 303; Cass, supra note
270; George J. Terwilliger, III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes: Addressing
the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417 (2007);
Crews & Young, supra note 270.
306. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 303, at 19–20. See generally, e.g., Ronald A. Cass,
Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671 (1976); Coffee,
supra note 303; Terwilliger, supra note 305.
307. See generally, e.g., Over-Federalization Hearing, supra note 303, at 29–46 (statement
of John G. Malcolm, Rule of Law Programs Policy Director, Heritage Foundation); Coffee,
supra note 303; Terwilliger, supra note 305.
308. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 303, at 20–21; Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS
IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38, 47
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Daniel C. Richman & William J.
Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611 (2005). See generally, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra, at 87; David M. Uhlmann,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159 (2014).
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CONCLUSION
Concerns about Auer deference given voice by justices, judges, and
scholars rightly point out difficulties with its assumption that ambiguous
administrative rules essentially confer discretion on administrators to adopt
any reasonable construction of those rules. Administrators hardly can be
thought constitutionally capable of conferring discretionary authority on
themselves and their successors. Deference to administrative decisions in
such settings is in tension with structural-constitutional concepts, due
process–related requirements of impartiality in rule construction, and
concerns about predictability and manipulability of rules (i.e., the “fair
notice” or “fair warning” concern). Technical expertise or experience
enjoyed in greater measure by administrators than judges is not enough to
justify deference in such settings. In short, eliminating the Auer doctrine in
its present form serves important legal and governance values.
However, when Congress by law confers discretionary authority on an
administrator or administrative agency—and that authority does not exceed
the permissible scope of what Congress can delegate to an administrator—
there is no sound basis for automatically treating that assignment as a nullity.
When delegations are not problematic, exercise of discretionary authority—
and the corollary of deference by reviewing courts—can be defended.
Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with the
Constitution, extending deference—and especially expanding deference as
Auer does in seemingly endless fashion—exacerbates delegations’
difficulties. Reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine is much to be
hoped for—it would not eliminate the expansive administrative state but
would rein in some of its worst abuses and most constitutionally questionable
aspects.309 That hope would fly in the face of eighty years of almost
complete acquiescence in broad, unstructured, even inexplicable delegations
to administrative agencies.
Absent such a development, demanding that the statutory basis for
deference is clearly articulated—that Congress plainly convey authority for
administrators to exercise discretion at the second level of rule
implementation as well as the first level of more direct statutory
implementation—is a modest first step in cabining problems associated with
constitutionally questionable delegations of lawmaking authority. Both
advocates and critics of the administrative state should support grounding its
assignments in lawmaking that meets basic constitutional commands.

309. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring); id. at 1240–41, 1253–55 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See
generally, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, Running Riot, supra note 21; Cass, supra note 20;
DeMuth, supra note 267; Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 267; Lawson, supra note 20; Rao,
supra note 20; Schoenbrod, Substance, supra note 20.

